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Introduction
The fact that individuals are not always unperturbed by the moral and emotional en-
vironment, information absorbing, equipped with a memory capacity of an infinitely
large computer chip and money maximizing has evoked the field of behavioral eco-
nomics. Individuals that decide about choices and interact in groups are found to
have social preferences, do not process all information accurately or suffer from bi-
ased perceptions. One example which illustrates that our human senses sometimes
perceive information in a biased manner is the following visual trick. If you look at
the figure and if you are a human with a not too poor eyesight you will see wavy lines,
because your senses trick you and the objective truth, that all lines are straight, is
not obvious to you. You might even want to get out a ruler to control your biased
perception.
Humans can maximize monetary outcomes and solve mathematical problems, but
their decision making depends tremendously on the emotions evoked by the context,
the presentation and the complexity. With this dissertation I want to give you an
understanding of the interesting phenomena of biased self-assessments like overcon-
fidence by providing a reason for overconfident appearance and survival. Further,
an analysis of the consequences of overconfidence and potential de-biasing nudges
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are discussed. Overconfidence is an omnipresent finding in the literature of psychol-
ogy and also economics that influences our decision making in economic as well as
non-economic situations. For example, when asking university professors whether
they are better or worse than the average professor, many more answer that they
are better than that they are worse.1 This biased perception does not only occur for
university professors, and also for a wide range of tasks like test taking or car driving.
A positive self-image is a desirable and important trait and encourages humans to
become involved and withstand new challenges Be´nabou and Tirole (2002). However
a systematic bias like overconfidence has been blamed as a reason for excessive market
entry, costly delays in negotiations, excessive litigation, and excessive stock trading
(see e.g. Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Neale and Bazerman (1985), Odean (1998)).
An interesting question is why do we observe such overly optimistic statements
and why do humans not learn that not everyone can be better than the other one.
My coauthor Florian Zimmermann and I propose image concerns and social approval
seeking as an explanation why decision makers forgo monetary incentives and that
image concerns prompt them to misreport their private information in an overly
positive way. This means that the outcome of the decision making process is highly
influenced by whether an audience is listening or not. Another important question
concerns the consequences of self-assessment biases on economic situations and how
to prevent bad consequences. I analyze the implications of absolute and relative
self-assessment biases on the entry choice into a competitive environment and what
kind of information can nudge individuals to raise attention to the complexity of the
decision problem.
Chapter one considers situations where truthful revelation of private information
maximizes monetary utility. My coauthor and I ask whether reports of private infor-
mation about skills, abilities or achievements are affected by image concerns. Such
reports of private information might be important for example for a principal who
has to allocate tasks and workers efficiently. Our hypothesis is that image concerns
might affect reports in such a way that humans appear overconfident to the audi-
ence by revealing private information about ability or skill in an overly optimistic
1While this example might even be true if there is one really, really bad professor, it is easy to
come up with other evidence (see Englmeier (2004) for a survey overview).
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way. Our approach to analyze this problem is by developing a simple model that
illustrates how image utility can lead to misreporting of private information in con-
texts where truthful reports maximize monetary outcomes. In addition, we test the
model’s predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment. In the experiment, all
subjects go through a series of incentivized quiz questions and subsequently have to
report a performance measure. They have to assess whether their quiz performance
was better than the average performance and receive 5 euros for a correct assessment.
We vary if reports are made to an audience or not and find evidence for image effects.
In the audience treatment, stated reports are significantly higher than in the private
treatment. This suggests that overconfident appearance might be a consequence of
social approval seeking. We also find that men state higher self-assessments than
women. This gender difference seems to be driven by men responding more strongly
to the presence of an audience.
As a consequence of overconfident self-assessments, overestimation of ability and
skill, the choices in various decision problems are affected. For example, occupational
choices between fix wages or performance dependent wages are biased towards the
latter one. Chapter two studies entry choices into a competition game, where the
entry choice depends highly on the individual’s self-assessment about performance.
We study the influence of information on entry choices with a controlled labora-
tory experiment and investigate whether information provision attracts mainly high
performance individuals and reduces competition failure. Competition failure occurs
when an individual loses the competition because the opponent holds a higher produc-
tivity. In the experiment, subjects face the choice between a competition game and
a safe and fix outside option. We analyze subjects’ entry behavior with a benchmark
treatment without information and three treatments, where we exogenously manipu-
late the information on the opponents. In one treatment, we disclose the performance
distribution of all subjects before each subject decides about entry. In two further
treatments, we disclose the matched opponent’s true performance or the matched
opponent’s true performance plus the opponent’s performance self-assessment. Infor-
mation on the opponent is a promising nudge to raise individuals’ awareness towards
the complexity of the decision problem and to update beliefs about success. We
present two main results on the usefulness of information and further results on sub-
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ject’s characteristics like gender and self-assessments that contribute to the literature
on self-selection into competition. Our results are, (1) information about the pro-
ductivity distribution of all potential opponents reduces competition failures by more
than 50%, (2) information on the distribution is sufficient, i.e. precise information on
the matched opponent’s type does not further diminish failure rates. Furthermore,
we find a gender difference in competition entry choices in the benchmark treatment
which vanishes when giving precise information about the opponent’s performance.
Several findings concerning the relationship between our different absolute and rela-
tive self-assessment measures are also discussed.
In the last chapter my coauthor Roland Eisenhuth and I study loss aversion in
auctions. The concept of loss aversion makes the point that losses are perceived worse
than equal sized gains; empirical work showed that losses are on average twice as worse
as equal sized gains are good. Only framing a sentence like ”Chances of survival are
95%.” into a loss frame ”Chancess of death are 5%.” make humans perceive the same
situation on average as twice as worse. And since emotions and the environment are
a major influence factor for decision making, loss aversion impacts choices in many
environments.
In Chapter three, we theoretically and experimentally study independent private
value auctions in the presence of bidders who are loss averse in the sense of Ko¨szegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007). In one specification, we consider gains and losses in two
dimensions separately, about whether they receive the object or not, and how much
they pay; in the other specification, we consider gains and losses over the entire risk
neutral pay off, i.e. the valuation less the bid. With one dimension, we show that
the expected revenue for the auctioneer is higher in the first price auction than in the
all pay auction, and with two dimensions, we show that the opposite is true for the
revenue ranking between the first price auction and the all pay auction. In order to
test the theoretical predictions, we conduct laboratory experiments, in which either
money or a real object is auctioned off in both a first price auction and an all pay
auction. In both settings, the average revenue is significantly higher in the first price
auction, suggesting that bidders may behave according to the one dimensional model,
although a real object is auctioned off. Whereas our findings are inconsistent with
the two dimensional model, they are consistent with the one dimensional model.
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Chapter 1
Image and Misreporting
1.1 Introduction
Individuals hold private beliefs about their performance, skills, abilities and achieve-
ments. These beliefs are key determinants in many economic choices, such as in-
vesting in education, choosing an optimal health insurance plan, applying for a new
position or accepting a new job. Likewise, transmission of this private information is
crucial for economic interactions. For instance, efficient allocation of tasks within a
firm relies on information about employees’ skills and abilities. The same is true for
decisions about job promotions or efficient specialization. In this paper, we analyze
whether individuals’ image concerns can lead them to misreport private information
in situations, where truthful revelation would be optimal from a traditional pecuniary
persepective. Individuals who care about how they are perceived by their environ-
ment, will take this perception into account when making choices or assessing own
performance and abilities in front of others. We show with a simple model how the
presence of image concerns makes people misreport their own performance, skill or
ability. Individuals with low performance will choose to report high performance.
Then we provide evidence from a lab experiment. In the experiment we exogenously
increase subjects’ image concerns with a procedure used by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier
(2009), and document the consequences of a desire for a favorable image on state-
ments about own performance.
In our model, decision makers’ choice is to publicly report private information
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about their own type. Correctly stating their private information is optimal in direct
monetary terms. However, we assume that decision makers’ utility consists of two
components, a “standard” part, reflecting monetary concerns and an image part, re-
flecting reputational concerns (similar as in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) in the context
of prosocial behavior). The way we model image concerns is a shortcut that captures
all benefits from signaling a high type. The nature of reputational concerns could
be strategic. In labor market contexts, signaling of abilities and skills may improve
hiring prospects and lead to higher wages or promotion. Benefits could also be in
the form of social approval. Alternatively, decision makers could value reputation
for hedonic reasons. People simply enjoy being regarded as a high type. We show
the existence of a unique Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, where a decision maker
misreports private information. Low skilled types choose to signal a high type, if
image concerns are relevant. We also show that misreporting increases in the relative
importance of image utility. While we focus on social image concerns, our model is
also compatible with a self-signaling interpretation where decision makers learn about
their own type by inference from own choices (e.g., as in Be´nabou and Tirole (2004,
2006)).
We test the main prediction of our model, that image concerns lead to misreport-
ing of private information, in a laboratory experiment. The experiment consists of
two stages. In stage 1, subjects go through a series of general knowledge quiz ques-
tions. In stage 2, subjects are asked to give a binary and incentivized self-assessment
concerning their quiz performance. We study two main treatments: In the audience
treatment, we exogenously increase subjects’ image concerns in stage 2 by making
them report their self-assessment to the other subjects present in the lab. After all
subjects have given their binary assessment, one after the other has to stand up and
report his or her self-assessment to the group. In the private treatment, subjects do
not report their assessment to the group. Our data reveal significant evidence for im-
age effects. In the audience treatment, stated self-assessments are significantly higher
than in the private treatment. We also document a gender difference in stated self-
assessments, with men reporting higher performance than women. This difference is
driven by a stronger response of men to the presence of an audience.
Our findings show that image concerns play an important role in the transmission
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of private information about skill, ability or performance. Even if truthful report-
ing is optimal in monetary terms, decision makers misreport. This contributes to
a large literature that has documented significant biases in stated self-assessments.
If individuals are asked to assess their own type in terms of performance or ability,
their self-assessments are frequently overly optimistic. One of the most prominent
examples of highly optimistic beliefs is a study by Svenson (1981) on relative self-
assessments in the context of car driving skills. He finds, for instance, that 40% of
subjects place themselves in the top 20% of car drivers with regard to driving skills.
Overconfident self-assessments are also found when subjects are given monetary in-
centives to correctly evaluate their skill or performance (see Hoelzl and Rustichini
(2005)).1 Our theoretical and experimental results suggest, that documented biases
in self-assessments might be produced by a desire to gain a favorable image. By trying
to signal a high type, decision makers appear overconfident. This can occur even with
perfect knowledge about their own performance, skill or ability. Decision makers can
appear overconfident without any inherent biases in self-assessments. The recipient
of signals can be an audience, peers, employers etc. In experimental settings, the
recipients can be other subjects (as in our experiment), the experimenter, but also
the decision-maker himself. In this self-signaling interpretation, the decision-maker
learns about his own type from observing his own choices. In the psychology liter-
ature, the idea that people construct their own type or self-image from past choices
can be found in Bem (1972).
Our findings allow a novel perspective on biases in self-assessments. We show
that stated self-assessments can differ between conditions that are identical in all
dimensions, except the presence of an audience. This difference cannot be due to
a passive, inherent bias or mistake. Instead, the bias in stated self-assessments is
actively chosen. Individuals respond to the presence of an audience by making a
strategic choice to misreport own performance. In this interpretation, overconfidence
is rather the outcome of a preference, e.g., a desire to signal skills or ability, than a
mistaken self-perception. This perspective on overconfidence also offers a straightfor-
1For a recent overview on empirical studies on overconfidence, see Benoˆıt and Dubra (2011). Sev-
eral studies examine the consequences of overconfidence for behavior in different contexts. Examples
are Dohmen and Falk (2011) in the context of tournament entry, Malmendier and Tate (2008) for
CEO behavior, DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) for overestimation of future gym attendance or
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) for excess entry into competitive markets.
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ward explanation for why people do not “learn” about their mistaken self-assessment
over time. In our setup, individuals can appear and behave overconfident even with
perfect knowledge about their own type.
Our experimental findings can also help to provide an explanation for why men
appear to be more overconfident than women. A gender difference in self-assessments
has been reported in many studies and provides an explanation for gender differences
in selection into competition (see for example Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), Gneezy,
Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Dohmen and Falk
(2011)). We find that men appear more overconfident than women in the audience
treatment, but not in the private treatment. This suggests, that men feel a stronger
desire to signal skills or abilities towards others, resulting in overconfident appearance.
Note that other explanations for overconfident behavior have been suggested:
Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) provide a theoretical argument for a value of self-serving
beliefs as these can increase motivation of individuals with imperfect willpower. Other
models assume a value of self-confidence and show how overconfident self-assessments
can be produced by selectively choosing information or by asymmetrically processing
information, putting more weight on positive than on negative information (see for ex-
ample Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)), Ko˝szegi (2006) or Mo¨bius et al. (2011)). Re-
cently, several experimental papers have provided support for biases in information-
processing and information demand (see Eil and Rao (2011), Mo¨bius et al. (2011)
and Charness, Rustichini, and van de Ven (2011) ). Benoˆıt and Dubra (2011) provide
a different explanation. They argue that most of the evidence for relative overcon-
fidence can in fact be reconciled by correct Bayesian updating from common priors.
In other words, evidence in the form “40% of subjects place themselves in the top
20% of good car drivers” should not be interpreted as evidence for overconfident self-
assessments as it can be the outcome of correct updating from unbiased information.
While all approaches are important and in concert provide a good explanation for
documented behavior, our experimental results highlight the crucial role of image
concerns for stated self-assessments.
Our findings are also informative from a methodological perspective. They sug-
gest that appropriate monetary incentives alone might not be sufficient to ensure
truthful revelation of self-assessments in experiments or surveys. The presence of
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image concerns creates a trade-off between image concerns and monetary outcomes
which leads to biases in stated self-assessments. Minimization of image concerns via,
for instance double-blind procedures, might help mitigating this problem. Likewise,
our findings are relevant from a mechanism design perspective. They show that
mechanisms designed with a purely monetary focus do not necessarily lead to truth-
ful revelation of private information. If people have strong image concerns, these
ought to be taken into account when designing optimal mechanisms, e.g., insurance
plans or employment contracts. While our focus is on direct transmission of private
information, our results apply more generally. In many decision contexts that require
prior self-assessment, decision makers’ choices allow them to signal skill, ability or
performance to others. We discuss this in more detail in section 1.5.
This paper relates to a few recent papers that considered the social signaling
component of biases in self-assessments. Burks et al. (2010) compare different expla-
nations of overconfidence in a large survey study with truck drivers. Their results
suggest a strong connection between image concerns and overconfidence. Truckers
reporting that they care about how others perceive them, significantly overplace their
performance in an IQ test and a numeracy task. Charness, Rustichini, and van de
Ven (2011) provide experimental evidence that men exploit the possibility to send
an exaggerated productivity signal in a strategic interaction of a tournament entry
to deter entry of other individuals while women do not. In their paper, they also
find evidence for a consumption value from overconfidence.2 In a related experiment,
Reuben et al. (2010) find that subjects exaggerate past performance in order to be-
come a group leader. In contrast, we focus on situations without a monetary incentive
to misreport.
More broadly, this paper relates to several papers that study consequences of im-
age concerns on economic decision making in different contexts. So far the literature
has mainly analyzed effects of social approval for prosocial decision making. Non-
anonymity or the presence of an audience has been shown to increase prosociality
(see Ga¨chter and Fehr (1999), Rege and Telle (2004), Andreoni and Petrie (2004)
and Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009)). Theoretical papers analyzing image concerns
2Eil and Rao (2011) and Mo¨bius et al. (2011) also provide evidence for a consumption value
from overconfidence.
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in a prosocial context include Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2008) and Andreoni and Bernheim (2009). Closest to our modeling approach is the
paper by Be´nabou and Tirole (2006). They show how extrinsic incentives can crowd
out prosocial behavior, because they destroy the image rewards from prosocial activ-
ity. Recently, Falk and Zimmermann (2011) examined the role of image concerns in
the context of consistency of behavior. They show that individuals want to behave
consistently as this allows the signaling of strength. In our paper, we show that the
desire to signal skills or ability can lead to misreporting of private information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
our model. Section 1.3 presents the experimental design, section 1.4 the results from
our experiment and section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
We provide a simple framework that allows illustrating how image concerns can in-
fluence reports of private information.
Consider decision makers D that differ in a parameter p which is an element of
P = {0, 1, ..., p¯}. Depending on the context, p captures D’s ability, skill, performance
or achievement. p is D’s private information but is commonly known to be distributed
according to a probability function f defined over P . At first, we assume that decision
makers have perfect knowledge about p. In Appendix 1.A we provide a version of the
model where decision makers have imperfect knowledge about their type and show
that this produces qualitatively the same results. Decision makers’ choice x is to
report some measure related to p in public. We assume a binary report: is p larger
than some value r? This report could be absolute (is p higher than a certain number?),
or relative to others (is p higher than the average or the median performance of
other decision makers?). Thus, we have that x ∈ {Y es, No}. Decision makers win
a monetary prize y if their stated report is correct, otherwise they earn 0. Thus,
choice x and prize y reflect contexts where truthful reporting of private information
is optimal in direct monetary terms. In experimental settings, choice x and prize y
simply capture an incentivized self-assessment. More generally, choice x could be a
decision that depends on p, e.g., the choice to enter a tournament, and the prize y
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reflects direct monetary consequences from that choice. Note that the prize y might
also capture direct nonmonetary utility consequences from misreporting, e.g, costs of
lying.3
We assume that utility has two sources, direct (monetary) payoffs and image
utility. Money enters linearly in the utility function and the two components are
additively separable. Thus utility is given by
U(x) = y1(x) + αβE(p | x).
The first part captures direct utility over money. 1(x) is an indicator function
taking the value 1 if the stated report is correct and 0 otherwise. The second part
incorporates image utility. E(p | x) is the public’s expectation about D’s perfor-
mance, skill or ability p, conditional on D’s choice x. Thus, the public infers decision
makers’ p from their reports, and social approval depends on that. α and β specify
the strength of image concerns. α is an individual parameter, i.e., decision makers
differ in α. Some D care more about their image or respond more strongly to social
approval than others. α is assumed to be constant across contexts and environments.
While α is D’s private knowledge, it is commonly known to be drawn from a distri-
bution described by a density function g over [0, α] with g(α) > 0, ∀α ∈ [0, α]. We
assume that performance or ability p and the desire for social approval α are drawn
independently. β instead, is identical for all decision makers and we assume β > 0. β
might depend on the context of the decision problem, e.g., the size of the public, the
social distance between D and the public or the strategic value of a favorable image.
Thus, β is the parameter that is exogenously manipulated in our experiment. An
alternative interpretation of decision makers’ image concerns is a desire for a positive
self-image (similar as in Be´nabou and Tirole (2004, 2006)).4 In this case, decision
makers receive a private signal about their performance or ability prior to their deci-
sion. Thus, when deciding, they hold information about their p. However, for their
later self-evaluation, this knowledge is not available for example due to reasons of
3Gneezy (2005) and Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) examine lying behavior in different contexts.
They find evidence that subjects lie, but also that there is some cost of lying that prevents subjects
from lying 100%.
4In the psychology literature, the idea that people construct their self-image from past actions
can be found in Bem (1972).
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imperfect recall. Since actions are easier to recall than signals, decision makers base
their self-evaluation on past stated reports.
We are now ready to state the following two Propositions (proofs are provided in
Appendix 1.A):
Proposition 1. If α is sufficiently large, i.e., αβ
[∑
p>r
f(p)p∑
p>r f(p)
−∑p≤r f(p)p∑
p≤r f(p)
]
>
y, there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium where decision makers with
p < r and α > α∗ choose x = Y es. Decision makers with p > r choose x = Y es and
those with p < r and α < α∗ choose x = No.
Proposition 1 shows, under which conditions exists a unique Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium where decision-makers misreport their private information. If image
concerns are large enough, i.e., image gains from choosing x = Y es,
αβ
[∑
p>r
f(p)p∑
p>r f(p)
−∑p≤r f(p)p∑
p≤r f(p)
]
, outweigh the monetary costs y, decision mak-
ers with low performance (p < r) and relatively high image concens (α > α∗) will
report x = Y es in order to signal a high type.
Proposition 2. An increase in β reduces the threshold type α∗. Consequently, more
decision makers with p < r misreport by choosing x = Y es.
Proposition 2 shows how reports change in β, for example, when the size of
the public, the social distance between D and the public, or the strategic value of
reputation changes. Our model predicts that an exogenous increase in image concerns
increases the number of decision makers that misreport information. Consequently,
reports become less informative. This is the comparative static we exploit with our
experiment.
1.3 Experimental Design
Our model suggests that the desire for social approval will tempt decision makers to
misreport their private information in public. To test this hypothesis, we introduced
a simple choice environment where subjects held private information about their
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skill or performance. Then, we manipulated image concerns exogenously by varying
whether private information is reported to a public or not.
Table 1.1 summarizes our experimental between-subjects design. We study two
main treatments, an audience treatment and a private treatment. In both treatments,
the experiment started with a short introductory game. Subjects, one after the other,
were asked to stand up and provide the group with some personal information such
as name, age, and field of study.5 The main part of the experiment consisted of
two stages. In stage 1, subjects were asked to answer 20 multiple-choice quiz ques-
tions. The questions covered various general knowledge topics like history, economics,
math, or art. Subjects were given four possible answers and had to select one. We
incentivized the quiz, such that subjects earned 40 cents for every correct answer.
The number of correctly answered questions serves as our measure of performance.
Subjects received no feedback regarding the number of correctly answered quiz ques-
tions. Therefore, they held private but not necessarily perfect information about their
performance. In stage 2, subjects faced a simple incentivized self-assessment task.6
We asked them to compare their own performance to the average quiz-performance
of a group of other participants. The group of other participants consisted of 95
different subjects who also performed the quiz. We asked: “Do you think your quiz-
performance was better or worse than the average performance of another group?”7
Subjects received 5 euros for a correct self-assessment. Thus, monetary incentives to
tell the truth were strong. The only difference between our two treatments was the
following: In the audience treatment, all subjects entered their self-assessment into
the computer, and then reported their self-assessment to the other subjects present in
the lab. Subjects knew in advance that they had to report the assessment to the other
subjects. Thus, after all subjects privately assessed their relative quiz-productivity
and entered it in the computer, one after the other had to stand up, say their name
5The purpose of the introductory game was to reduce the social distance between partcipants.
Ga¨chter and Fehr (1999) show in the context of a public goods game that social approval incentives
are only effective in combination with a procedure to increase familiarity among group members.
6Subjects were only informed about the self-assessment task after they finished stage 1.
7Studies that want to document relative overconfidence usually use comparisons to percentiles
such as the median. For our question, identifying overconfidence is not the main goal, because
we are particularly interested in the treatment effect on reported self-assessments. Therefore, we
decided to use the simpler and more comprehensive average as measure of comparison.
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and report their self-assessment to the group.8 This procedure of introducing an au-
dience to increase image concerns has been used for example in Ariely, Bracha, and
Meier (2009) in the context of pro-social behavior. The private treatment was iden-
tical to the audience treatment, however subjects did not state their self-assessment
towards the other subjects.
Table 1.1: Design of the experiment
Stage 1 Stage 2 Treatments Questionnaire
Multiple-choice quiz Self-assessment 1. Private: no
further
- Number of correct
answers is our measure
of performance
- 40 cents / correct
answer
- Are you better
or worse than the
average?
- 5 euros / correct
self-assessment
action
2. Audience:
reporting
self-assessment to an
audience
- Risk
- Survey
questions
- Demographics
1.3.1 Experimental Procedures
47 subjects participated in the private treatment, 48 in the audience treatment. We
were interested in potential gender differences and therefore invited an equal amount
of women and men to each session. All sessions of the experiment were conducted
in the BonnEconLab, subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)) and the
experiment was run using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
A session took on average 50 minutes and subjects earned 9.50 euros on average.9
We distributed the instructions for stage one and two immediately before the stage
started and they were read aloud.
8While subjects reported their private information (self-assessments) in front of the audience,
their previously entered self-assessment was also shown on their computer screen to make sure
subjects could not lie about their entered self-assessment.
91 euro was worth about 1.4 dollar at the time.
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1.3.2 Hypothesis
In the experiment, we systematically increase image concerns of subjects by intro-
ducing an audience. When comparing the private and the audience treatment, by
Proposition 2 of our model, reported self-assessments should be higher in the audi-
ence treatment compared to the private treatment.
Hypothesis. Subjects choose “better than average” more frequently in the audi-
ence treatment than in the private treatment.
1.4 Results
In section 1.4.1, we compare reports of the audience and the private treatment. In
addition, we show the influence of gender on our treatment effect and analyse indi-
viduals’ perceptions of others’ stated self-assessments. In section 1.4.2, we present
results from an additional control treatment we conducted.
1.4.1 Main Results
Result 1. There is a treatment difference in stated self-assessments: Subjects in the
audience treatment report “better than average” significantly more often compared to
subjects in the private treatment.
We find that 68% of subjects in the audience treatment report to be “better than
average”, compared to 48% of subjects in the private treatment. This sizable effect
is also statistically significant in probit regressions. Table 1.2 reports the marginal
effects of three probit regressions (columns 1-3), regressing a treatment dummy and
several controls on reported self-assessment, where 1 indicates a report “better than
average”.10 Column 1 of Table 1.2 shows that the raw treatment effect is significant
at the 5% level. Our finding is robust when controlling for different measures of quiz
performance. In column 2, we take the number of correctly solved quiz questions
10Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.2 are discussed later.
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Table 1.2: Determinants of stated self-assessment
Dependent variable: Relative self-assessment=
{
1 if report is “better than average”
0 if report is “worse than average”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All All Private Audience
Dummy treatment 0.20**
(0.09)
0.25**
(0.12)
0.27**
(0.12)
Quiz performance 0.07***
(0.03)
0.07*
(0.04)
0.08**
(0.04)
Dummy quiz performance 0.16
(0.11)
Dummy gender -0.31***
(0.11)
-0.37***
(0.10)
-0.21
(0.18)
-0.28**
(0.12)
Controls included included included included
N 95 95 95 47 48
-LL 62 50 53 24 18
Notes: Probit estimates. Marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of independent variables) reported;
robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by
***, **, and *, respectively. Dummy treatment =1 if audience treatment and 0 if private treatment.
Dummy gender =1 if female. Dummy quiz performance =1 if better than average. Controls include a
survey based risk measure, a measure of image concerns, age, and relationship status.
as a control for quiz performance. In column 3, we use a different measure: we
create a performance dummy, taking the value one if performance was actually better
than average and zero otherwise. In both regressions, the treatment effect remains
significant at the 5% level.11 In addition, nonparametric testing with a Fisher-exact
test also confirms result 1 (p− value = 0.06, two-sided).
A different way to look at our data is to analyze the treatment effect for different
11Note that the average quiz performance over all treatments is 14.4 correctly solved quiz
questions. The distributions of quiz performance do not significantly differ across treatments
(p − values > 0.34 of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests). The comparison group of 95 participants had
an average quiz performance of 14.3 which is also not significantly different from performances of
subjects in our treatments.
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intervals of actual quiz performance. According to our model, the treatment effect
should be driven by subjects who place themselves below the average, when privately
evaluating own performance, but want to signal high quiz performance towards oth-
ers. With perfect, as well as with imperfect knowledge of their performance (see
Appendix 1.A), most subjects with low quiz performance privately place themselves
below average, while those with high performance, mostly place themselves above av-
erage. Consequently, our model predicts that stated self-assessments for subjects with
rather high quiz performance should be similar between treatments, while reports for
subjects with low quiz performance should differ between treatments. This is indeed
what we find. Figure 1.1 depicts the percentages of subjects in the audience and
the private treatment who report to be better than average for different intervals of
actual quiz performance, centered around the average of the comparison group (14.3
questions). Among subjects that clearly solved more questions than average (more
than 15 correctly solved questions), 72 % report to be better than average in the au-
dience treatment, compared to 69 % in the private treatment. For subjects with low
quiz performance (less than 13 correctly solved questions), however, we have a very
pronounced treatment difference. While 57 % report to be better than average in the
audience treatment, only 27 % do so in the private treatment. This suggests, in line
with our model, that our treatment effect is mainly driven by subjects who privately
place themselves below average, but want to signal high performance towards others.
Additional, more indirect evidence that high reported self-assessments are associ-
ated with social approval comes from two survey questions we asked at the end of the
experiment. First, we were interested in whether subjects enjoyed the quiz (“How
much did you enjoy the quiz?”). Second, we asked whom subjects would hire if they
were the boss of a firm on the basis of reported self-assessments. The three possible
answers were: Somebody who reports ’better than average’, ’worse than average’, and
’I do not care’. We find that 64% of our subjects enjoyed the quiz or enjoyed it very
much. Only 10% indicated they did not like the quiz. Also, none of the subjects was
willing to hire a worker that reports “worse than average” in the audience treatment
and only 13% would do so in the private treatment.
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of “better than average” reports for high, low and close to
average quiz performance subjects in the audience treatment and private treatment.
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Result 2. There is a gender difference in reported self-assessments: Men report
“better than average” significantly more often. This difference seems to be driven by
a stronger response of men to the presence of an audience.
We find a gender difference in reported self-assessments. By inspection of Table
1.2 we find in regressions (2) and (3) that the probability to choose “better” is higher
for men than women. The marginal effect of the gender dummy is significantly dif-
ferent from zero. A gender difference in self-assessments has been reported in many
studies and provides a possible explanation for the gender difference in selection into
competitive environments (see for example Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), Gneezy,
Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Dohmen and Falk
(2011)). Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1.2 show separate Probit regressions for the pri-
vate and the audience treatment. The data indicate that the gender effect is mostly
driven by more men overreporting in the audience treatment. While men report
to be “better than average” significantly more often than women in the audience
treatment, the effect is not significant in the private treatment. This finding might
provide a possible explanation to gender differences in overconfidence. It suggests,
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that men feel a stronger desire to signal skills or abilities towards others which results
in overconfident appearance.12
Result 3. The public is aware of misreporting due to image concerns when eval-
uating subjects’ reports.
Does the audience anticipate that the report “better than average” might be
driven by image concerns? To answer that question, we asked our subjects in the ques-
tionnaire about their perception and beliefs regarding the reported self-assessments
of the other participants. We asked: “When subjects stated their self-assessment,
do you think the other participants overestimated, underestimated or correctly es-
timated their performance?” Table 1.3 summarizes the answers. We find that a
majority of subjects in the audience treatment (56%) thinks that others misreport
and state too optimistic assessments. Only 26% hold a similar view in the private
treatment. A Fisher-exact test confirms a significant difference (p = 0.01), where
we categorize subjects’ perceptions in “overreport” or not. Thus, we find evidence
that the audience anticipates misreporting and adjusts beliefs accordingly. This find-
ing supports the mechanism of our model. The decision maker chooses to signal a
high self-assessment, the public anticipates this and adjusts beliefs about the decision
maker’s type downwards.13
1.4.2 Additional Control - Feedback Treatment
Our model predicts a treatment difference in reported self-assessments between the
audience and the private treatment, which is caused by subjects’ desire to signal a
high type towards the other subjects in the audience treatment. To verify that sig-
naling is really the key driver of our treatment effect, we conducted an additional
12Note, however, that this interpretation should be taken with caution. In Appendix 1.B we
report the marginal effects of a probit regression with interactions of a gender dummy and treatment
dummy (I Treatment*Women). The marginal effect of this interaction describes the difference of
the gender effect in the audience treatment compared to the private treatment. The difference is
negative. In line with our interpretation, men report especially in the audience treatment that they
are better than average, however not significantly more often than in the private treatment.
13Ludwig and Nafziger (2011) explore subjects’ beliefs about other subjects’ confidence bias
and find that the majority believes that others are unbiased, and only few think that others are
overconfident.
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Table 1.3: Subjects’ beliefs about the other participants’ self-assessments
Private treatment Audience treatment
Overreport 26 % 56 %
Correct 40 % 42 %
Underreport 34 % 2 %
treatment that allowed us to control for the signaling of ability. The feedback treat-
ment was identical to the audience treatment. The only difference was that after
subjects reported their self-assessment to the audience, the experimenter informed
the audience whether the assessment was correct or not. In this situation, the public
learns the true relative performance and therefore subjects can no longer use their
reports to signal ability. Thus, if misreporting in the audience treatment is driven by
the signaling of skills or ability, the effect should vanish once we take the possibility to
signal ability away. Consequently, we should observe that reported self-assessments
do not differ between the private and the feedback treatment. 48 subjects participated
in the feedback treatment and procedures were identical to the two other treatments.
Result 4. Reported self-assessments do not differ significantly between the feed-
back treatment and the private treatment.
We find that 56% of subjects choose to report “better than average”. Compared
to the private treatment with a frequency of 48%, there is no significant difference
(p-value=0.54 using a Fisher exact test). Table 1.4 reports the marginal effects of
probit regressions with and without controls for the private and feedback treatment.
The treatment effect is insignificant in all regressions.
Result 4 provides additional evidence that image concerns, via the signaling of a
high type, can lead to misreporting and overconfident appearance. While subjects
used the opportunity to signal ability in the audience treatment, our treatment ef-
fect vanishes, once we take away the possibility to signal ability via our feedback
treatment.
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Table 1.4: Determinants of stated self-assessment in the private and feedback treat-
ment
Dependent variable: Relative self-assessment=
{
1 if better
0 if worse
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy treatment -0.07
(0.10)
-0.03
(0.12)
-0.05
(0.11)
Dummy gender -0.09
(0.13)
-0.22*
(0.12)
Quiz performance 0.11***
(0.03)
Dummy quiz performance 0.21*
(0.11)
Controls included included
N 95 95 95
-LL 65 48 54
Notes: Probit estimates. Marginal effects (evaluated at the mean of
independent variables) reported; robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *,
respectively. Dummy treatment =1 if feedback treatment and 0 if private
treatment. Dummy gender =1 if female. Dummy quiz performance =1 if
better than average. Controls include the survey based risk measure, image
concerns, age, and relationship status.
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1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we studied the consequences of image concerns on reports of private
information. We illustrated with a simple model how a desire for social approval
can give rise to overconfident behavior. In addition, we conducted a controlled lab
experiment that supports predictions of our model. In the experiment, subjects stated
a higher self-assessment when an audience is present than in private. We also find
that men choose more often than women to signal ability and confidence especially
when an audience is present.
Our findings show that biases in self-assessments might be produced by image con-
cerns. As a consequence, decision makers can appear overconfident even with perfect
knowledge about their own performance, skill or ability, in other words, without in-
herent biases in self-assessments. This is also an explanation why overconfidence is
persistent. Receiving feedback and learning one’s type over time might not prevent
decision makers from appearing overconfident.
In our experiment, we manipulated image concerns by letting subjects report their
self-assessment to an audience. The audience was mainly composed of students that
did not know each other and thus social distance between decision makers and the
public was rather high. We expect that in more intense social contexts, e.g. talking
to one’s supervisor, boss, parents or friends, the magnitude of our finding might be
even larger. Furthermore, we did not provide direct strategic reasons for image or
reputational concerns. An interesting set-up to implement an instrumental value of
appearing skilled or able would be as follows: subjects would randomly be assigned to
the roles of principals and agents. In each session there would be twice as many agents
as principals. Agents would go through our quiz questions and then (anonymously)
state a self-assessment towards the principal assigned to them. The principal has to
select one of the two agents for an additional quiz and has incentives to select the
agent he thinks is most able. Agents would be given incentives for being selected.
We suspect that agents would overstate self-assessments to increase the likelihood of
being selected by the principal. Therefore, stated self-assessments in such a treatment
should be higher compared to our control treatment.
While the main focus of the paper is on social image concerns, our model is also
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compatible with a self-signaling interpretation. Instead of signaling skill or confidence
to others, decision makers care about how they perceive their own self. In this inter-
pretation, self-image is built from past actions. While beliefs about performance are
available when making choices, later self-evaluation is built on past actions because
actions are easier to recall than beliefs (e.g., Be´nabou and Tirole (2004, 2006)). This
is important, as much of the evidence on overconfidence has been in rather (though
usually not perfect) private environments. In such environments, self-signaling (as
well as signaling towards the experimenter) might be a key driver of overconfidence.
Although this is not explicitly modeled in our framework, the self-signaling inter-
pretation might give rise to inherent biases in self-assessment. Interestingly, these
biases would not stem from selective choice of information or asymmetric informa-
tion processing (like for example in Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), Ko˝szegi (2006)
or Mo¨bius et al. (2011)) but from self-evaluation based on biased past choices.
Finally, while the main focus of this paper is on direct transmission of private
information, our results apply more generally. In many choice environments that
require prior self-assessment, decision makers’ choices allow the signaling of skill,
ability or performance towards others. Consider the choice to enter a tournament.
The decision to enter or not clearly depends on individuals’ private self-assessment.
The money-maximizing choice for individuals with low skills and abilities is usually
not to enter the tournament. In the presence of image concerns, however, individuals
with low skills might yet decide to enter, as this allows them to signal skill and abilities
to others. In the context of participation in welfare programs, image concerns and
social approval seeking might lead to low participation rates due to fear of reputation
losses. Moffitt (1983) presents data from different welfare programs in the U.S. in
the 1970’s. He reports that as much as 30 - 60 % of the citizens who are eligible for
welfare do not apply and argues that this is a consequence of the fear of stigmatisation
of welfare recipients.
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1.6 Appendix
Appendix 1.A
Proof of Proposition 1:
In equilibrium, all D with p > r choose x = Y es. It is straightforward to show
that this is optimal, given that it maximizes both monetary outcomes and image
utility. For decision makers with p < r, behavior depends on the strength of image
concerns. There exists a threshold type α∗, such that all D with p < r and α > α∗
will choose x = Y es and those with p < r and α < α∗ choose x = No. The threshold
type α∗ with p < r must be indifferent between potential image gains from choosing
x = Y es and monetary losses from reporting incorrectly. We have the following
indifference condition:
α∗β
∑
p>r
f(p)p+
ˆ α
α∗
g(z)dz
∑
p≤r
f(p)p
 1∑
p>r f(p) +
´ α
α∗ g(z)dz
∑
p≤r f(p)
(1.1)
= y + α∗β
∑
p≤r
f(p)p∑
p≤r f(p)
.
The left hand side captures image utility in case D chooses x = Y es, which is
simply a weighted average of the average performance, skill or ability of decision
makers with p > r and those with p < r, with weights depending on how many Ds
misreport. The right hand side captures image utility when choosing x = No, which
is simply the average performance or ability of Ds with p < r plus the prize y for
reporting correctly. Rearranging equation 1.1 leads the following:
α∗β
 1∑
p>r f(p) +
´ α
α∗ g(z)dz
∑
p≤r f(p)
∑
p>r
f(p)p+
ˆ α
α∗
g(z)dz
∑
p≤r
f(p)p
 (1.2)
−
∑
p≤r
f(p)p∑
p≤r f(p)
 = y.
One can see from equation 1.2 that decision makers with α < α∗ and p < r
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optimally choose x = No. As the expression in square brackets remains unchanged
but the strength of image concerns is smaller (αβ < α∗β), image gains in total are
smaller than monetary losses, i.e., they will state a truthful report x = No. D’s with
α > α∗ instead optimally choose x = Y es as their image gains loom larger than their
monetary losses. Note also, that if α is sufficiently large, the threshold type α∗ and
thus the equilibrium, always exists. To see this, take the left hand side of equation
1.2 and vary α∗. If α∗ approaches zero, the left hand side approaches zero as well.
As α∗ approaches α, the left hand exceeds y by assumption. Furthermore, the left
hand side is continuous and strictly increasing in α∗. Consequently, there necessarily
exists an α∗ for which equation 1.2 holds.
To show uniqueness of the equilibrium, first note that in every equilibrium, the
types with very low image concerns (α→ 0) will always choose the money-maximizing
outcome, i.e., those with p < r optimally choose x = No and those with p > r op-
timally choose x = Y es. Next we show that there cannot be an equilibrium where
decision makers with p > r do not choose x = Y es. Suppose there would be such an
equilibrium. Then the image utility from choosing x = No necessarily would need
to be greater than the image utility from x = Y es. In that case however, all D
with p < r would also choose x = No. This leads to a contradiction because then
the public will infer a lower p from x = No than from x = Y es and consequently
image utility from x = Y es would be higher. Thus in every equilibrium, some D
with p < r and low values of α will choose x = No and all D with p > r choose
x = Y es. Also, by assumption α is large enough such that some D with p < r choose
x = Y es. From that it is easy to see that every equilibrium has a threshold type α∗,
such that decision makers with p < r and α > α∗ will choose x = Y es and those with
α < α∗ will choose x = No. From equation 1.2 we see that α∗ and consequently the
equilibrium described above is unique.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof is straightforward. Considering equation 1.2, one can see that a change
in β affects the threshold type α∗. An increase in β reduces the threshold type, in
other words, more decision makers with p < r will choose x = Y es.
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Model with Imperfect Knowledge:
So far, we assumed that decision makers perfectly know their p. However, one
could argue that in most real-life situations, individuals only have imperfect knowl-
edge about their skills or abilities. Also, in our experiment subjects are likely to
be uncertain about their performance. In this section, we analyze what happens
if decision makers have imperfect knowledge about their type but know more than
the public. The crucial difference to the case with perfect knowledge is that type-
uncertainty weakens the informativeness of decision makers choices. Intuitively, it is
more difficult for the public to infer ability from choices, if decision makers themselves
are uncertain about their ability.
The set-up is identical to above. The only difference is that decision makers do
not perfectly know their p. Instead, they hold a point belief pˆ ∈ {0, 1, ..., p¯} and pˆ is
(potentially) different from p.14 D’s choice x is again to report whether p is larger
than some value r, i.e., x ∈ {Y es, No}. Given their imperfect knowledge about p,
it is possible that decision makers wrongly assess whether their p is larger or smaller
than r¯. We specify the imperfect knowledge about p as follows. Let φ(p) denote the
likelihood that decision makers point belief pˆ is larger (smaller) than r¯ although the
true p is smaller (larger). Thus φ(p) is the probability that pˆ > r¯ although p < r¯ or
pˆ < r¯ although p > r¯. We make the following assumptions about φ(p). First of all,
we naturally assume that φ(p) < 1
2
for all p. Second, we assume that φ(p) is strictly
increasing in p for p < r¯, and strictly decreasing in p for p > r¯. In other words, the
likelihood that Ds think that their p is larger (smaller) than r¯, although it is smaller
(larger) increases the smaller the difference between p and r.
We now show that decision makers still have incentives to misreport their private
information pˆ. The key difference between a set-up with imperfect knowledge and
one with perfect knowledge is, that the public’s inference about performance from
choices x changes. Since the public is aware that decision-makers only have imperfect
knowledge about their performance, the informativeness of reports x about perfor-
mance p is reduced. However, the informativeness does not vanish. One can show
that if all decision makers report truthfully, i.e. they maximize monetary utility in
14To focus on the effect of type uncertainty on the informativeness of choices, we abstract from
risk by assuming point beliefs about ability.
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the absence of image concerns, the public infers higher ability from reports x = Y es
compared to reports x = No, that is E(p | x = Y es) > E(p | x = No). We have
that E(p | x = Y es) =
∑
p>r(1−φ(p))f(p)p+
∑
p<r φ(p)f(p)p∑
p>r(1−φ(p))f(p)+
∑
p<r φ(p)f(p)
is greater than E(p | x = No) =∑
p<r(1−φ(p))f(p)p+
∑
p>r φ(p)f(p)p∑
p<r(1−φ(p))f(p)+
∑
p>r φ(p)f(p)
.
Thus, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 3. If α is sufficiently large, there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium where decision makers with pˆ < r and α > α∗ choose x = Y es. Decision
makers with pˆ > r choose x = Y es and those with pˆ < r and α < α∗ choose x = No.
Proposition 3 corresponds to Proposition 1 in the set-up with perfect knowledge.15
The condition for α being sufficiently, however, is more demanding compared to the
perfect knowledge case. α needs to be large enough such that the image gains from
choosing
x = Y es, αβ
[∑
p>r(1−φ(p))f(p)p+
∑
p<r φ(p)f(p)p∑
p>r(1−φ(p))f(p)+
∑
p<r φ(p)f(p)
−
∑
p<r(1−φ(p))f(p)p+
∑
p>r φ(p)f(p)p∑
p<r(1−φ(p))f(p)+
∑
p>r φ(p)f(p)
]
out-
weigh the monetary costs y. The reason that this condition is more demanding than
that in the case of perfect information is that type uncertainty reduces the reputa-
tional gains from choosing x = Y es. Therefore image concerns need to be higher
in the case of imperfect knowledge of own type. Proposition 3 shows that also with
imperfect knowledge, decision makers have incentives to misreport private informa-
tion. The intuition is simple. Although decision makers are not perfectly informed
about their own skills, performance or ability, they know more than the public. Con-
sequently reports x have some informative value for the public and thus the signaling
motive for decision makers still exists.
For variations in common image utility β, the same comparative statics hold as
in section 2.2.2.
Proposition 4. An increase in β reduces the threshold type α∗. Consequently,
more decision makers with pˆ < r misreport by choosing x = Y es.
15The logic of the proof is the same as for Proposition 1.
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Appendix 1.B
Table 1.5: Determinants of relative self-assessment in the private and audience treat-
ment with interactions
Dependent variable: Relative self-assessment=
{
1 if better
0 if worse
Dummy treatment 1.36
(1.39)
Gender dummy -0.19
(0.16)
I Treatment*Gender dummy -0.23
(0.28)
Quiz performance 0.06*
(0.03)
I Treatment*Quiz performance 0.05
(0.06)
Controls included
N 95
-LL 42
Notes: Probit estimates. Marginal effects reported; robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level
is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. Dummy treatment =1 if
audience treatment and 0 if private treatment. Dummy gender =1 if
female. Controls include the survey based risk measure, image
concerns, age, relationship status, and interactions of the Dummy
treatment with each variable.
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Appendix 1.C
Instructions, translated into English. General instructions and instructions for the
first part of the experiment were identical across treatments. Instructions for the sec-
ond part of the experiment differed across treatments.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
You are taking part in a decision-making experiment in which you have the oppor-
tunity to earn money. The amount of money you earn is paid to you upon completion
of the experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. The instructions are iden-
tical for all participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The
experimenter will answer your question at your place. During the experiment, you
have to remain silent. Violation of this rule leads to immediate exclusion from the
experiment and all payments.
All monetary units in the experiment are measured in tokens, and 100 tokens =
1 euro.
This experiment consists of two parts. In both parts, you can earn money. Your
payoff from the experiment results from the sum of your payoffs in both parts. In
the following we will go through the instructions for the first part of the experiment.
After the first part is completed, we will provide you with the instructions of the
second part.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FIRST PART OF THE EXPERIMENT
In the first part of the experiment you will be asked 20 quiz questions. You will
always be offered 4 possible answers of which exactly one will be correct. Please
always select one of the four possible answers. For each correct answer you get 40
tokens. After you have answered the first 10 questions, please click on the OK button.
Then a new screen with 10 more questions will appear. Please confirm your responses
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again with the OK button.
Do you have any questions?
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SECOND PART OF THE EXPERIMENT - (Pri-
vate Treatment)
All participants have answered 20 quiz questions in the first part of the experi-
ment. In this part of the experiment, you need to assess whether your quiz result
is better or worse than the average result of another group of participants. If your
assessment is correct, you get 500 tokens; if your assessment is wrong, you get 0
tokens. This will be further explained below in more detail.
The quiz questions you were asked in the first part of the experiment, were also
answered by a group of 95 participants (all of which (like you) participated in an
experiment in the BonnEconLab) some time ago. You now need to assess whether
your performance in the quiz was better or worse than the average performance of
the group of 95 participants. You get 500 tokens for a correct assessment, otherwise
you get 0 tokens.
Please read these instructions again carefully.
An input box appears soon on your screen into which you can enter your decision.
Do you have any questions?
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SECOND PART OF THE EXPERIMENT - (Au-
dience Treatment)
All participants have answered 20 quiz questions in the first part of the experi-
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ment. In this part of the experiment, you need to assess whether your quiz result
is better or worse than the average result of another group of participants. If your
assessment is correct, you get 500 tokens; if your assessment is wrong, you get 0
tokens. This will be further explained below in more detail.
Note the following: After all participants entered their assessment into the com-
puter, all participants must report their assessment to the other participants. Every
participant will be called up individually one after the other. Once it is your turn,
you have to stand up, say your name and report your assessment.
So if you stated that you think your quiz result was better than the average of
the other group, then you have to stand up after you were called and say: ”My name
is ... and I think I was better than the average of the other group.”
If you stated that you think your quiz result was worse than the average of the
other group, then you have to stand up after you were called and say: ”My name is
... and I think I was worse than the average of the other group.”
Below we will explain your decision in more detail.
The quiz questions you were asked in the first part of the experiment, were also
answered by a group of 95 participants (all of which (like you) participated in an
experiment in the BonnEconLab) some time ago. You now need to assess whether
your performance in the quiz was better or worse than the average performance of
the group of 95 participants. You get 500 token for a correct assessment, otherwise
you get 0 token.
Please read these instructions again carefully.
An input box appears soon on your screen into which you can enter your decision.
Do you have any questions?
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SECOND PART OF THE EXPERIMENT - (Feed-
back Treatment)
All participants have answered 20 quiz questions in the first part of the experi-
ment. In this part of the experiment, you need to assess whether your quiz result
is better or worse than the average result of another group of participants. If your
assessment is correct, you get 500 tokens; if your assessment is wrong, you get 0
tokens. This will be further explained below in more detail.
Note the following: After all participants entered their assessment into the com-
puter, all participants must report their assessment to the other participants. Every
participant will be called up individually one after the other. Once it is your turn,
you have to stand up, say your name and report your assessment. Also note: Af-
ter you have reported your assessment, the experimenter will tell you and the other
participants, whether your quiz result was actually better or worse than the average
score of the other group.
So if you stated that you think your quiz result was better than the average of the
other group, then you have to stand up after you were called and say: ” My name is
... and I think I was better than the average of the other group.” If your quiz result
was indeed better than the average performance of the other group, the experimenter
will announce: ”The quiz result of Mr. / Ms. XY was better than the average score
of the other group.” If your quiz result was indeed than the average performance of
the other group, the experimenter will announce: ”The quiz result of Mr. / Ms. XY
was worse than the average score of the other group.”
If you stated that you think your quiz result was worse than the average of the
other group, then you have to stand up after you were called and say: ”My name is
... and I think I was worse than the average of the other group.” If your quiz result
was indeed worse than the average performance of the other group, the experimenter
will announce: ”The quiz result of Mr. / Ms. XY was worse than the average score of
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the other group.” If your quiz result was indeed better than the average performance
of the other group, the experimenter will announce: ”The quiz result of Mr. / Ms.
XY was better than the average result of the other group.”
Below we will explain your decision in more detail.
The quiz questions you were asked in the first part of the experiment, were also
answered by a group of 95 participants (all of which (like you) participated in an
experiment in the BonnEconLab) some time ago. You now need to assess whether
your performance in the quiz was better or worse than the average performance of
the group of 95 participants. You get 500 token for a correct assessment, otherwise
you get 0 token.
Please read these instructions again carefully.
An input box appears soon on your screen into which you can enter your decision.
Do you have any questions?
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Chapter 2
Information and Competition
Entry
2.1 Introduction
Competition is a major force of economic behavior and interactions. Examples of
competition are business formation, job promotion, occupational choice, or sports
tournaments. The decision to enter a competition clearly depends on individu-
als’ private self-assessment about performance. However, absolute and relative self-
assessments about performance are often inaccurate (e.g. Weinstein (1980), Taylor
and Brown (1988)). As a consequence of overconfident self-assessments and neglecting
the performance of the opponents, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) find excessive market
entry in a laboratory experiment. Too many subjects entered the market and there-
fore the market share is lower than an outside option. Similarly, competition failure
often yields less monetary utility than an outside option, where competition failure
occurs if an individual loses the competition, because the opponent holds a higher
performance. For example, new businesses frequently fail after inception as a result
of overconfidence and entrepreneurs earn less money than in a paid job according to
their performance (e.g. Koellinger, Minniti, and Schade (2007)).
The goal of our study is to explore whether information influences entry deci-
sions in a competition game. We ask whether information on the opponents reduces
competition failure by preventing entry of overconfident individuals and by attract-
34
ing mainly high performance types. Competition failure is an especially interesting
criteria, because it informs us about the frequency of individuals that waste money
due to losing the competition instead of choosing a higher outside option. Evidently,
information is beneficial in various contexts for the decision making process. In the
competition game, information can nudge individuals to update their performance be-
liefs and think more carefully about the complexity of the decision problem and the
chances of success. In consequence, we expect fewer competition failures. However,
the updating process might not be correctly applied and it is possible that informa-
tion even fosters the overconfidence bias. We briefly discuss the effects of absolute
and relative self-assessment biases on entry choices in the competition game and when
information might be beneficial. The latter results as an outcome of the magnitude
of self-assessment biases, individuals’ updating process and it’s interactions, which
we explore empirically with a lab experiment.
For the ideal empirical analysis of the effect of information on entry choices, we
need to have control over the information available to each individual. In addi-
tion, we need clean measures of individuals’ performance and self-assessments about
performance. Therefore, we make use of the advantages of a controlled laboratory
experiment instead of a field experiment. In the competition game, success depends
on the performance of an ex ante performed quiz task. We elicit absolute and relative
self-assessments about subjects’ quiz performance. Subjects are randomly matched
in groups of two and decide about entering the competition or opting for an outside
payment. A subject wins the competition, if the matched opponent did not enter, or
if he or she has a higher performance than the opponent. We set up a benchmark
treatment, No Info, in which subjects receive no additional information and three
information treatments with a between-subject design. In treatment Distribution,
the performance distribution of all subjects in the session is revealed, before subjects
made their decision to enter. In treatment True, we reveal more precise data on
the matched opponent, that is the matched opponent’s true performance. To study
whether there is a discouraging or encouraging impact of the opponent’s over- or
underconfidence, we study in treatment True & Belief, the entry choice by disclosing
information on the matched opponent’s performance and his or her absolute perfor-
mance self-assessment. This variation of aggregated and precise information allows
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us to exactly measure the frequency change of entry choices and competition failure
rates for different types of information disclosure.
Competition entry in the information treatments is significantly lower compared
to the benchmark treatment. We find evidence for competition failure especially in
the benchmark treatment, No Info, which is mainly driven by overplacement, i.e. ne-
glecting the performance of the opponents (similar to Camerer and Lovallo (1999)),
instead of overestimation, gender or willingness to take risks. Analyzing the data
of the information treatments reveals sizable and significant improvements by infor-
mation. The two major findings are firstly, competition failures decrease by 57%,
when providing information on the performance distribution and secondly, more pre-
cise information does not further improve entry choices. This implies that simple
and aggregated information on the performance distribution is sufficient to decrease
competition failure rates by a striking value. Our data show also that the decision to
enter depends strongly on performance in the information treatments, but not in the
benchmark treatment. This complements the usefulness of information disclosure to
attract high performance individuals for the competition. Disclosing the opponent’s
performance has a high and significant influence on entry. In addition, the knowledge
of an overconfident opponent discourages entry, but not in a significant way. Note
that we do not analyze a strategic choice of self-assessments on the opponent’s entry
choice. Reuben et al. (2010) show that exaggerating one’s self-assessment strategi-
cally in a team environment, helps to become the leader of a team. And Charness,
Rustichini, and van de Ven (2011) find a similar result for a competition environment
where the disclosure of the opponent’s high self-assessment discourages competition
entry. However, both papers do not disclose the opponent’s true performance at the
same time when they disclose the self-assessment. Furthermore, we confirm the find-
ing of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), who point out that due to a gender difference
in overconfidence, women shy away from competitive environments more frequently
compared to men, in the benchmark treatment and treatment Distribution. The gen-
der difference in competition entry vanishes in the treatments where the performance
of the matched opponent is disclosed.
A large literature in psychology and experimental economics emphasizes the find-
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ing of self-assessment biases (e.g. Svenson (1981), Weinstein (1980)).1 The conse-
quences have been studied in various economic environments like business contexts.
For example, Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1988) conclude that entrepreneurs over-
estimate their chances of success with their new business, which in consequence leads
to competition failure. Also, Dunning, Meyerowitz, and Holzberg (1989) and Bald-
win (1995) report business failures shortly after market entry. For a similar survey
study and a recent overview see Koellinger, Minniti, and Schade (2007). In addition,
overconfidence has been highlighted as a major force in costly delays in labor negoti-
ations, excessive litigation, excessive stock trading and subsequent market volatility,
(see, e.g. Neale and Bazerman (1985), Odean (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2001), Malmendier and Tate (2008)). Our findings contribute to this
literature by showing how consequences of self-assessment biases can be mitigated
in a competition environment. In addition, our study contributes to the literature
on sorting behavior in competitive environments. A competition is usually set up
to attract high performance types. Dohmen and Falk (2011) conclude that in addi-
tion, relative self-assessments, gender, and willingness to take risks are vital personal
attitudes that effect competition entry choices when studying decision making of stu-
dents in a laboratory experiment and also of a representative sample of the German
population. Experimental studies on entry decisions by Camerer and Lovallo (1999),
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Bartling et al. (2009) also show that subjects with
high relative self-assessments self-select into the competition more frequently.
In the last years, a growing literature on libertarian paternalism by psychologists
and economists aims at encouraging and supporting individuals in economic and non-
economic decision finding (e.g. Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008)). Examples are the
analysis of optimal default options (e.g. Choi et al. (2003)) or school interventions.
Our study contributes to this literature by showing that providing simple and inex-
pensive information helps our subjects to make better decisions in the competition
game. Our controlled laboratory findings might have similar effects in real life sit-
uations of competitive environments. An established application where information
1Several explanations, for why self-assessment biases are present in many contexts and still per-
sist have been proposed, for instance self-image concerns (Be´nabou and Tirole (2002), Ko˝szegi
(2006)), asymmetrical processing of positive and negative information (e.g. Brunnermeier and
Parker (2005), Mo¨bius et al. (2011)), or social image concerns (e.g. Burks et al. (2010), Ewers
and Zimmermann (2011)).
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of past performances is used to decrease allocation and application costs, is the uni-
versity place allocation system ZVS in Germany. Here, prospective students learn
the distribution of school grades of former accepted students for the respective field
and university of the last year before applying. Other possible implementations in
practice might be interventions at employment agencies or firms. For instance, public
and private employment agencies could emphasize the importance of the opponents
performance in a competition by providing information about market characteristics,
where startup businesses want to engage in. Firms often collect data about workers’
performance, effort, cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Before announcing (internal)
job-promotions, firms could disclose anonymously the performance outcomes of for-
mer workers to reduce irrelevant applications. Banks or venture capital companies,
that finance credits for startup businesses could disclose probabilities of success for
the market segment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present the
experiment with the design and hypotheses. Section 2.3 provides the results. Finally,
Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Experiment
In the ideal experimental set up for a clean analysis of competition entry decisions,
we need to know subject’s beliefs about their own and relative performance, their
true performance, and further individual characteristics like willingness to take risks
and gender. We conduct our experiment in the laboratory instead of conducting a
field experiment to secure control about the information each subject has and we
can precisely manipulate and vary the information provision. Confounding factors
that might influence subjects beliefs are ruled out and additional information about
further key variables is available, e.g. risk attitudes and entry costs.
2.2.1 Experimental Design
We present now the four main parts of our experiment. In the first part, we pin down
subjects performance for the competition. In part two, subjects assess their absolute
and relative beliefs about performance. In part three, subjects play the competition
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entry game and receive information or not about the opponent previous to their
entry choice. In part four we analyze subjects’ willingness to take risks. Finally, the
experiment ends with a general questionnaire after the risk task.
In the first part, subjects’ performance is determined by a multiple-choice quiz
of 20 questions and no time limit. The quiz contained questions concerning history,
arts, economics, and orthography. Subjects received 20 points for a correct quiz
answer. All monetary quantities of the experiment are denominated in points; 100
points are equal to one euro. Subjects did not receive feedback on the number of
correct quiz answers or the amount of earned money. Thereby, subjects could not
learn, and will never learn during the experiment, their true quiz performance, where
quiz performance is defined as the sum of correct quiz answers. We decided for the
quiz task instead of a real effort task, because we are mainly interestes in the effect of
information on entry decisions and not on performance changes. While the influence
of information and feedback on performance changes is worthy to study, we want to
exclude these additional impacts to gain control about the pure effect of information
on entry decisions in a competition. The performance in the quiz is only determined
by knowing the answers and exerting effert is a minor factor.
We employed five incentivized self-assessment questions to elicit subjects’ abso-
lute and relative self-assessments on quiz performance. Not all five, but only one
measure was paid to impede any hedging motives. We studied different questions
to receive overestimation and overplacement measures and to perform consistency
and robustness checks. A subject exhibits overestimation (underestimation) if her
absolute self-assessment is better (worse) than the true quiz performance and a sub-
ject exhibits overplacement (underplacement) if her relative self-assessment is better
(worse) than the true relative quiz performance.2 The first two questions were used
to analyze overestimation: (i) How many quiz questions have you solved correctly?
(ii) For the second overestimation measure, subjects had to distribute 100 points into
21 categories. Every category was associated with the number of correct quiz answers
and all points had to be distributed.3 Our three questions on overplacement are: (iii)
2The studies by Healy and Moore (2008a) and Healy and Moore (2008b) point out that the
distinction of overconfidence in overestimation and overplacement is crucial for the decision making
process and much of the previous literature confuses these two concepts.
3For example, a subject that is sure to have answered more than one question correct should
place zero points into category “0” and “1”.
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Is your amount of correct quiz questions one of the best 12 or worst 12 quiz perfor-
mances in the room?, (iv) How many of the other participants in the room solved
more quiz questions correct than you?, (v) How many of the other participants in the
room have less correct answers than you? A subject’s payoff for (iii) was 100 points
for a correct assessment. Subject’s payoff for (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) was 200 points
for a correct assessment and 50 points for guessing one category next to the correct
answer. We define overconfidence and underconfidence by calculating the difference
between the actual quiz performance and the five statements (see Table 2.5 in the
Appendix 2.A for more details).
After subjects’ quiz assessment, we conducted the competition game in the third
part of the experiment. We employed a between subject design for the study of four
treatments including a benchmark treatment and three information treatments. Sub-
jects were randomly matched in pairs of two and decided to enter the competition
or not. Before they made their decision, we provided information according to the
treatment they participated in. In the benchmark treatment, No Info, they received
no additional information. In the Distribution treatment, we provided information
about the quiz performance distribution of all subjects in the room by showing a
table with the amount of subjects that had 0, 1, 2,...,20 questions correct on the
screen. In treatment True, each subject received information about the quiz perfor-
mance of his or her matched opponent and in treatment True & Belief, each subject
received information on the matched opponent’s quiz performance and, in addition,
the performance belief from the self-assessment question (i) (see also Table 2.1 for
an overview of all treatments). Note, that this was not known to subjects when they
answered the self-assessment questions.4 We can then study exactly what kind of
information reduces or increases competition entry and competition failure.
The rules of the competition game are the following: If a subject does not enter
the competition, he or she receives an outside option of 200 points. If only one subject
enters the competition, he or she wins the competition automatically and receives the
winner prize of 400 points. If both subjects enter the competition, the subject with
the highest quiz performance wins the competition and the loser receives the loser
4For strategic choices of reports of self assessments see for example Ewers and Zimmermann
(2011) or Charness, Rustichini, and van de Ven (2011).
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prize of 100 points. The loser prize is of course smaller than the outside option,
otherwise all subjects enter the competition. If subjects with the same performance
enter, a subject wins either the winner or loser prize with probability 0.5. Thus,
subjects’ performance of the previous task is relevant for the probability of winning
the competition. The only action of the subjects is to decide about the entry decision.
Subjects do not perform another quiz task. To secure the understanding of the game,
we asked several control questions before the game started.
The experiment ended with a task to elicit risk attitudes. Subjects made 30
decisions between a lottery and a secure payoff. The lottery was always the same: It
provides a 50% chance to win 400 points and a 50% chance to win 100 points. The
secure payoff increased from 0 to 400 points. A subject’s switching point was used
as an indicator for her willingness to take risks.
All sessions of the experiment were conducted at the BonnEconLab at the Univer-
sity of Bonn, subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)) and we used the
software z-Tree by Fischbacher (2007). We conducted eight sessions in March 2010
with 190 subjects from various fields of study and tried to have an equal amount of
women and men in every session to analyze a gender effect. Subjects answered all
questions and tasks at the computer. At the beginning of the experiment, all subjects
knew that the experiment consists of four parts and that they receive the instructions
of each of the four parts individually and immediately before the task started. The
average duration of a session was 50 minutes and the average payoff was 9 euros.
2.2.2 Overconfidence Hypothesis and Information Efficiency
If subjects hold a systematic bias about their absolute or relative quiz performance,
they might over- or undervalue their subjective utility of the competition game. In
consequence, overconfident subjects enter too often and underconfident subjects re-
spectively enter too rarely which leads to our hypothesis on entry behavior that we
explore with the laboratory experiment:
Hypothesis. If a subject is overconfident (underconfident), then she enters the
competition more (less) often than an unbiased subject holding everything else con-
41
Table 2.1: Information treatments
Treatment Information
No Info No additional information
Distribution Information about the performance distribution of subjects in the
room
True Information about the opponent’s performance
True & Belief Information about the opponent’s performance and performance
belief
stant.
The main purpose of this paper is to detect what information is a simple and
inexpensive way to decrease competition failure. Information is obviously a strong
tool to improve decision making in various contexts. Receiving information on the
opponent reduces uncertainty in the game and attracts the attention to the fact that
the decision problem depends highly on the opponents performance. In addition,
individuals can update their self-assessment, which might reduce the self-assessment
bias. However, in our two player game both subjects receive information at the same
time. Therefore, additional information might not necessarily be beneficial. The way
how individuals update their self-assessment is also crucial. Whether an overconfident
individual updates her belief downwards or rather fosters the overconfident belief has
an influence on the entry choice. Furthermore, the investigation of self-assessment
biases does always entail a discussion of higher order beliefs. The belief about what
others believe is of interest in this two player game, too. E.g., if a player assumes
that other players are underconfident, she will enter the competition too often.
If subjects hold perfect beliefs about their performance and the performance dis-
tribution, we expect no difference in entry decisions by providing information about
performance distribution in treatment No Info. However, the literature on self-
assessment biases emphasizes that many individuals hold too optimistic beliefs about
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their absolute and relative performance. On the one hand, knowing the distribution
about performance reduces uncertainty and we expect less wrong entry decisions. On
the other hand, it is very important how individuals actually use their new informa-
tion to update beliefs. For example, a player with a correct absolute self-assessment
and an overconfident relative self-assessment should optimally update the relative
self-assessment by updating it downwards. An overconfident player might instead
prefer to update her actually correct absolute self-assessment upwards.
In a similar vein, for unbiased subjects, the effect of information on the opponent’s
performance in treatment True should result in efficient entry decisions. The player
with the higher performance always enters and the other one chooses the outside
option. However, biased subjects might not choose efficiently.
In addition, we study how the entry choice is influenced by over- and underconfi-
dence of the opponent by disclosing the true performance of the opponent, and also,
we disclose the performance self-assessment of the opponent in treatment True & Be-
lief. The information of an overconfident opponent indicates that the opponent enters
very certainly and might discourage a player to enter. Or an underconfident opponent
encourages the entry decision although the opponent has a higher performance.
Obviously, we need to make several assumptions on 1. absolute and relative
self-assessment biases, 2. belief updating and 3. higher order beliefs, to claim that
information is beneficial. An analysis of these channels and its interaction is an inter-
esting task to deepen the understanding of individuals’ processing with uncertainty.
However, it is not the focus of our paper. We will analyze the effect of the information
on entry choices empirically within the experiment.
2.3 Results
We first present results on the entry frequency across treatments and the effect of
information on competition failure. All tests we use are two-sided. In 2.3.2 we present
the determinants of entry on performance and personal attitudes and in 2.3.3, we
discuss how overconfidence is distributed and correlated to personal attitudes.
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2.3.1 Entry Frequency and Information Efficiency
Result 1. The frequency of entry choices decreases significantly with information
compared to the benchmark treatment.
Figure 2.1: Percentage of competition entry by treatments
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In the benchmark treatment, No Info, a striking number of 93% of our subjects
chose to enter the competition, in treatment Distribution, only 63% entered, in treat-
ment True 74% and 63% in treatment True & Belief, respectively (see Figure 2.1).5
The large amount of entry decisions in the benchmark treatment shows that it is
rather a minor problem that underconfident, but high performance subjects do not
enter the competition. The difference of the benchmark treatment compared to the
information treatments is sizable. We test whether the large differences in entry fre-
quencies are significant using Fisher-exact tests and find that the entry frequency of
each information treatment is significantly different from the benchmark treatment
with a p− value = 0.001 for either Distribution or True & Belief as comparison and
5Observing such high entry rates may be the result of this particular design with small competi-
tion prizes. However, incentives are the same in all treatments and therfore the between treatment
analysis is not affected.
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p = 0.03 for treatment True as comparison. The difference is however not significant
when testing the frequencies of the information treatments against each other. This
implies that the provision of information intensely decreases entry choices, and it is
sufficient to provide aggregated data on the distribution of performance instead of
precise information on the opponent. This is an interesting finding for application
purposes, because aggregated data might be easier to collect than precise informa-
tion on the opponent. In the following, we analyze whether the decrease of the entry
frequency due to the provision of information, does also decrease competition failure
and improve efficient entry choices.
Result 2. The frequency of competition failure is significantly lower in treatment
Distribution and True & Belief compared to the benchmark treatment without infor-
mation. The main determinant of competition failure is overplacement instead of
overestimation, willingness to take risks or a gender difference.
Figure 2.2: Percentage of competition failure by treatments
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The goal of this study is to investigate whether information is useful to reduce
wrong entry decisions. To answer this question we focus on the criterion competition
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failure. This criterion is particularly useful, because it measures how often individuals
earn less money than they could actually earn. The data on competition failure reveal
a similar picture to the finding of entry frequencies and underline the important
result that information does not only decrease entry choices, but more essentially,
information prohibits wrong entry choices. We observe 35% of competition failures
in the benchmark treatment, while only 15% of subjects fail in treatment Distribution,
22% in treatment True and 15 % in True & Belief ( see Figure 2.2). The difference of
failure rates in the benchmark compared to Distribution or True & Belief is significant
in a Fisher-exact test with p = 0.03 and p = 0.17 for treatment True vs. No Info.
Note that 35% is a very high number, because the highest possible failure rate would
be that 50% fail.
The main driver of competition failure is overplacement, which is in the fashion of
a result by Camerer and Lovallo (1999), where neglecting the opponents performance
leads to market failures. Table 2.2 presents the determinants of competition failure
with probit regressions. The dummy variable competition failure takes the value 1 if
a subject entered the competition although the subject’s performance is lower than
that of the entering matched opponent. We analyze the influence of overestimation
and overplacement on competition failure by using subjects reports to question (i)
and (iv)6 of the self-assessment stage and compare them with the true performance
and performance ranking.7 We also control for risk attitudes and gender. We find
a significant influence of overplacement in treatment No Info. Subjects that believe
they are better than others experience a competition failure significantly more often.
This effect vanishes when providing information and it is only weakly significant in
treatment True & Belief. We do not find that willingness to take risks or gender
has explanatory power in determining competition failure. The general self-selection
analysis will be discussed in the next section.
6“How many quiz questions have you solved correctly?” and “How many of the other participants
in the room solved more quiz questions correct than you?”
7Using any of the other overconfidence definitions does not change the qualitative results.
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Table 2.2: Determinants of competition failure
Dependent variable: Competition failure=
{
1 if both enter and the performance is worse
0 otherwise
No Info Distribution True True &
Belief
Overplacement (iv) 0.15***
(0.04)
0.10
(0.08)
0.08
(0.06)
0.18*
(0.10)
Overestimation (i) -0.09
(0.09)
0.10
(0.08)
0.05
(0.10)
0.12
(0.19)
Willingness to take risks 0.02
(0.10)
-0.05
(0.14)
0.08
(0.15)
-0.31
(0.27)
Dummy gender 0.24
(0.46)
0.32
(0.53)
-0.92*
(0.51)
1.13
(0.84)
Constant -1.11
(2.3)
-0.25
(3.26)
-2.70
(3.55)
4.57
(6.09)
N 48 48 46 48
-LL 23.17 16.25 19.51 11.62
Notes: Coefficients of Probit estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The variable Willingness to take risks
indicates subjects’ switching point from the lottery choice task of part four of the experiment. A high
value indicates higher willingness to take risks. The variable Dummy gender takes the value 1 if male.
2.3.2 Self-Selection
Result 3. The gender difference in competition is only significant in the benchmark
and Distribution treatment.
In Table 2.3 we present the determinants of entry decisions separately for each
treatment and find similar results to previous findings of the literature on sorting
behavior in a competitive environment. For the analysis, we classify a subject as
overconfident with the following procedure. First, we generate one measure out of
our five overconfidence measures with a principal-component-analysis. All of our five
overconfidence measures are highly and positively correlated (see Table 2.4 in the Ap-
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pendix 2.A). We extract a linear combination that explains most of the composition
of all five measures. The first component score has an eigenvalue of 2.8 and therefore
explains 56% of the composed analysis. Also, all five variables have a similarly large
influence on the first component, such that the first component is an appropriate
measure. Then, we define a subject as overconfident if the value of the first score is
larger than zero and the subject is underconfident if it is smaller than zero.
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In the benchmark treatment, all male subjects enter and therefore only female
subjects can be included in the analysis of the No Info treatment. We find that
performance has no significant influence on entry in the benchmark treatment. In
all other treatments high performance types enter significantly more often. This is
particularly interesting, because it complements our previous results that informa-
tion is beneficial and is an additional criterion next to competition failure. Due to
the provision of information, the competition game attracts significantly often high
performance subjects. The average performance of subjects that enter in treatment
No Info is 12.95 and is lower compared to treatment Distribution, where the average
performance of entrants is 14.23. In addition, our data show that the well docu-
mented gender difference in competition entry behavior (see e.g. Gneezy, Niederle,
and Rustichini (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Dohmen and Falk (2011))
is also present in treatment No Info and Distribution, but vanishes in treatments
True and True & Belief. This suggests that women are not per se less competitive
and information, which reduces uncertainty about the opponent, decreases womens’
reluctance to enter the competition. 8
In treatment True & Belief we disclose the opponent’s self-assessment bias to
study whether it has an encouraging or daunting effect on competition entry. Our
data reveal that subjects enter the competition less often when facing a very confident
subject, however, the effect is not significant. In our experiment, subjects could
not choose their self-assessment strategically. Charness, Rustichini, and van de Ven
(2011) analyze the effects of a strategic self-assessment choice on entry behavior of the
opponent in a tournament environment. They find that subjects are intimidated by a
high self-assessment of the opponent and enter less often. Anyhow, they do not reveal
the true performance of the opponent. Table 2.3 reports that the true performance
of the opponent has a highly significant and sizable effect on entry choices in both
treatments True and True & Belief. This information is seriously taken into account,
such that the probability to enter is less likely if the opponent has a high performance.
8Similarly, Wozniak, Harbaugh, and Mayr (2010) analyze gender differences in compensation
decisions with a within subject design of several treatments, where they disclose subject’s own per-
formance and the performance of all opponents in one treatment and find that the gender difference
decreases.
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Table 2.3: Determinants of stated self-assessment
Dependent variable: Competition entry=
{
1 if subject enters
0 otherwise
No Info Distribution True True &
Belief
Overconfidence 0.33
(0.30)
0.46**
(0.21)
1.46*
(0.79)
0.21
(0.21)
Performance 0.04
(0.26)
0.39**
(0.18)
1.52**
(0.67)
0.24*
(0.15)
Opponent’s
performance
-1.18**
(0.47)
-0.45***
(0.18)
Opponent’s
performance
belief
-0.10
(0.12)
Willingness to
take risks
0.79**
(0.38)
0.30**
(0.13)
0.29
(0.27)
-0.01
(0.13)
Dummy gender dropped+ 1.75**
(0.75)
0.44
(0.71)
0.93
(0.72)
Constant -17.52*
(9.57)
-11.96***
(4.09)
-9.43
(9.40)
4.68
(3.88)
N 24 48 46 48
-LL 6.4 16 7.7 18
Notes: Probit estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 1, 5, and
10 percent level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. The variable Overconfidence is the
first component score of the principal component analysis of our five self-assessment measures.
The variable Willingness to take risks indicates subjects’ switching point from the lottery choice
task of part four of the experiment. A high value indicates higher willingness to take risks. The
variable Dummy gender takes the value 1 if male. +Gender dummy predicts entry perfectly.
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2.3.3 Existence and Robustness of Overconfidence
71% of our subjects think their quiz performance is better than the median perfor-
mance. We observe the existence of overconfidence and underconfidence (see Figure
2.3 in the Appendix 2.A for histograms of the distribution of all five measures of
overconfidence). However, mean and median of the overestimation measures are not
significantly different from zero. Only the mean, but not the median of our over-
placement measures (iv) and (v) is significantly larger than zero with p = 0.02 and
p = 0.06 of a t-test. The mean and distribution of performance does not systemati-
cally vary across treatments (p−values > 0.4 of Wilcoxon-ranksum tests and t-tests).
The average quiz performance is 13.5, the worst performance was 6 correct answers
and the best one was 19 correct answers. This indicates a mediocre task difficulty
level. Our finding coincides with the results by Healy and Moore (2008a) who find,
that easy tasks produce underestimation, difficult tasks produce overestimation, and
mediocre tasks produce on average no estimation bias. We find that all of our five
elicited measures of overconfidence are significantly and positively correlated. Table
2.4 in the Appendix 2.A reports a correlation table of all confidence measures and
performance. There exists a significantly negative correlation of performance and
overconfidence for the relative and absolute measures, which is robust when control-
ling for ceiling effects. Due to the definition of overplacement and overestimation, the
best performing subjects can never be overconfident and the worst ones can never be
underconfident. The negative correlation of overestimation and overplacement with
performance still persists and is significant (p − values < 0.05 for Spearman-rank
tests) when restricting the sample to productivities lower than 20, 19, 18, 17 or 16.9
Overconfidence in our setting is linked to an especially optimistic belief about one’s
performance type, while psychologists describe optimism as a positive view towards
uncertain future events or concentrating on the good sides of life. We employ a 10
item questionnaire on optimism at the end of all main tasks of the experiment to an-
alyze a connection to the economic definition of overconfidence. Indeed, we find that
the psychological measure of optimism is positively correlated with overplacement
9The low performance subjects can always underestimate their performance. However the worst
subjects can not underplace themselves. When omitting the best and worst subjects, the negative
correlation of overplacement and performance is still significant.
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(p = 0.08 of a Spearman-rank test).
2.4 Conclusion
Well adjusted absolute and relative self-assessments about skill, ability or achieve-
ments are important to decide about competition entry. However, individuals fre-
quently misestimate their own skill, ability or achievements. In this paper, we study
a competition game where subjects might have an absolute or relative self-assessment
bias about their performance. We ask whether subjects benefit from information
about the opponents by updating their performance beliefs which in consequence
should reduce competition failure. With a laboratory experiment, we can exogenously
vary information that we provide to subjects before they decide about entering the
competition or taking an outside option. Subjects enter the competition significantly
less often in our information treatments compared to the benchmark treatment. The
two main contributions of this study are firstly, simple aggregated information on the
performance distribution significantly reduces competition failure by up to 57%, and
secondly, aggregated information is sufficient and more detailed information does not
further reduce inefficiency. The information provision does not directly disperse the
self-assessment bias, but it raises the awareness for the opponent’s potentially high
performance and mitigates the consequences. Our findings suggest a simple and inex-
pensive way to reduce decision making that yields less monetary utility by increasing
individuals’ appreciation of the decision problem.
An interesting extension in the field would be an implementation at an em-
ployment agency or job center. The agency could provide aggregated information
for startup businesses like Ich-AGs in Germany (You-Inc.).10 For example, an en-
trepreneur who wants to start a restaurant could receive information on the current
amount of restaurants and restaurant failures. We expect less business openings and
less frequent business failures. In a similar vein, firms could provide a distribution
of the qualification of their workers before the hiring process to reduce the amount
of applications and organizational costs. Inexpensive information which is simple to
10Caliendo et al. (2007) show that 20-40% of You-Inc. start ups (“Ich-AG”) do not exists anymore
after 16 month and particular groups like facility managers fail especially often, because the demand
is already exhausted.
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understand might also be valuable in other economic contexts. Providing information
about competitors by disclosing past performances could reduce the baneful effects of
overconfidence in economic environments like labor negotiations, litigation, or stock
trading.
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2.5 Appendix
Appendix 2.A
Figure 2.3: Histograms of overconfidence measures (i) to (v)
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Table 2.4: Correlation table of our five measures of overconfidence and quiz perfor-
mance
Overestimation Overplacement
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
(i) 1
(ii) 0.77*** 1
(iii) 0.26*** 0.22*** 1
(iv) 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 1
(v) 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.44*** 0.90*** 1
Quiz performance -0.14* -0.19*** -0.25*** -0.68*** -0.68***
Notes: N=190. Significance of the Spearman-rank test at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is denoted
by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Table 2.5: Measures of absolute and relative overconfidence
Measure Level of overconfidence
(i) Degenerate = self-assessment - quiz performance (QP)
(ii) Token
distribution task
=
20∑
i=0
ti · i/20−QP , where ti is the amount of points for category i
(iii) Median =

1 if worse than median although indicated better
0 if median comparison is correct
−1 if better than median although indicated worse
(iv) Upward
distribution
= amount of subjects that are better - self-assessment
(iv) Downward
distribution
= self-assessment - amount of subjects that are worse
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Appendix 2.B
Instructions, translated into English. General instructions and instructions for first,
second, and fourth part of the experiment were identical across treatments. Instruc-
tions for the third part of the experiment differed across treatments.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
You are taking part in a decision-making experiment in which you have the oppor-
tunity to earn money. The amount of money you earn is paid to you upon completion
of the experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. The instructions are iden-
tical for all participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The
experimenter will answer your question at your place. During the experiment, you
have to remain silent. Violation of this rule leads to immediate exclusion from the
experiment and all payments.
All monetary units in the experiment are measured in points, and 100 points = 1
Euro.
This experiment consists of four parts. In all parts, you can earn money. Your
payoff from the experiment results from the sum of your payoffs in all parts. In the
following we will go through the instructions for the first part of the experiment.
After the first part is completed, we will provide you with the instructions of the
second part.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FIRST PART OF THE EXPERIMENT
In the first part of the experiment you will be asked 20 quiz questions. You will
always be offered 4 possible answers of which exactly one will be correct. Please
always select one of the four possible answers. You get 20 points for each correct
answer. After you have answered the first 10 questions, please click on the OK
button. Then a new screen with 10 more questions will appear. Please confirm your
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responses again with the OK button.
Do you have any questions?
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SECOND PART OF THE EXPERIMENT (Only
on screen)
We will ask you five questions concerning your estimation of your quiz perfor-
mance. The questions are on the screen and will not be read together. The questions
are identical for all participants. For each question, you can again earn points. The
points will be added to the points earned in the quiz. Please give your answers on
the screen and confirm them with the OK button. If you have any questions, please
raise your hand, we come to your place.
Question 1: Please estimate now as good as possible the number of your correct
quiz answers.
Your payment will look like this: You earn 200 points if your estimate is correct
and 50 points, if your estimate is a number next to the correct number.
Question 2: Please estimate now again as good as possible the number of your
correct quiz answers.
This time you do not have to commit to a number. Instead, you get 100 points
which you can allocate into any of 21 fields. Each field of 0-20 is the number of correct
answers. Your payment is as follows: The number of points that you have allocated
to the field that corresponds to your correct number of quiz answers will be doubled
and paid. The points, on a field next to the correct field, will be paid to 50%. For
example, participant xy has 10 correct answers and distributes the coins as follows:
Correct quiz questions ... 9 10 11 12 13
Token 0 10 50 40 0 0
then the participant gets: 0.5 · 10 + 2 · 50 + 0.5 · 40 = 125 points.
Please enter a ”0” in any field, where you do not want to allocate points to.
Question 3: Is your amount of correct quiz questions one of the best 12 or worst
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12 quiz performances in the room?
For a correct estimate you will get 100 points.
Question 4: What do you think, how many of the other 23 participants answered
more quiz questions correct than you?
You earn 200 points if you have guessed correctly and 50 points, if your estimated
number is one number next to the correct number.
Question 5: What do you think, how many of the other 23 participants have less
correct quiz answers than you?
You earn 200 points if you have guessed correctly and 50 points, if your estimated
number is one number next to the correct number.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE THIRD PART OF THE EXPERIMENT
In part 3 you will be randomly assigned to another participant of the experiment.
You will learn at no time of the experiment the identity of the assigned participant.
You decide in part 3, if you want to participate in a competition against your ran-
domly matched participant or not.
If you do not want to participate, you will get 200 points, whatever decision your
opponent takes.
If you want to participate, you will produce an individual output. The output
corresponds to your number of correct answers in the quiz. You compete against your
randomly assigned opponent with your output.
Output = number of correct quiz answers
Example: Player xy has solved 1 of 20 questions in the quiz correctly. If player
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xy participates, he or she produces an output of 1.
If you participate, your payoff depends on your own output and the output of
your opponent in case he or she participates, too. The rules of the competition are
as follows:
1. If you participate but your opponent does not, you win automatically.
2. If you and your opponent participate, you win if you have a higher output than
your opponent. But if you have a lower output than your opponent, you lose.
3. If you and your opponent participate and you both have the same output, the
computer randomly decides who wins and who loses.
The winner receives 400 points and the loser gets 100 points. You will find the payoff
matrix below on all of your decision screens.
Participation No participation
Winner prize 400 200
Loser prize 100 200
DECISION
The only thing you need to do is to decide for or against participation in the competi-
tion. You make your decision on the screen and confirm it with the button “Confirm
decision”.
CONTROL QUESTIONS
Before part 3 starts, we ask you a few control questions to ensure that all participants
understand part 3 of the experiment. You earn no money for correct answers of the
control questions, nor do we take money away from you for a wrong answer. However,
part 3 starts only when all participants have answered all control questions correctly.
Example: Player 1 solved 10 questions correct and player 2 solved 8 questions
correct.
Question 1: What is the output of player 1 if he enters the competition?
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Question 2: How many points does player 1 receive if he does not enter the
competition?
Question 3: What is the output of player 2 if he enters the competition?
Question 4: How many points does player 3 receive if he does not enter the
competition?
Question 5: Who wins the competition if both enter?
Question 6: How many points does player 1 get if both enter the competition?
Question 7: How many points does player 2 get if both enter the competition?
Question 8: How many points does player 1 get if only he enters the competition?
Question 9: How many points does player 2 get if only he enters the competition?
Any questions?
We present now the additional instructions four each treatment. Note that each
subject participated only in one treatment.
Treatment No Info You will be randomly assigned to one participant. You both
make your decision to participate in the competition. You receive no information
about the participant that is randomly matched to you and likewise your randomly
matched participant does not receive any information about you before you both
make your decision about participation in the competition. Your decision screen
looks like this:
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Please confirm your decisions by pressing the button ”Confirm decision ”. Any
questions?
Treatment Distribution You will be randomly assigned to one participant. You
both make your decision to participate in the competition. Before that, you get sum-
marized information on all participants in the room, including you. All participants
receive this information on the screen. On the screen, you will see a table with the
number of correctly solved quiz questions from 0-20 and the number of participants
that solved the corresponding number of quiz questions correctly.
Example: 12 participants answered all questions wrong, and the remaining 12
participants answered all questions correct. Your screen would look like this:
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Please confirm your decisions by pressing the button ”Confirm decision”. Any
questions?
Treatment True You will be randomly assigned to one participant. You both make
your decision to participate in the competition. Before that, you receive the informa-
tion how many quiz questions your randomly matched participant answered correctly.
This information is shown on your decision screen. Likewise, your randomly matched
participant will be informed about your number of correctly solved quiz questions.
Then both of you take the decision to participate. Your decision screen looks like
this with the respective number of correct quiz answers of your matched participant
:
62
Please confirm your decisions by pressing the button ”Confirm decision ”. Any
questions?
Treatment True & Belief You will be randomly assigned to one participant. You
both make your decision to participate in the competition. Before that, you receive
two pieces of information about your randomly matched participant.
1. how many questions he/she has correctly answered in the quiz
2. how many questions he/she estimated that he/she answered correctly.
This information is shown on your decision screen. Likewise, your randomly matched
participant will be informed about your number and estimation of your correctly
solved quiz questions. Then both of you take the decision to participate. Your deci-
sion screen looks like this with the respective number and estimation of correct quiz
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answers of your matched participant :
Please confirm your decisions by pressing the button ”Confirm decision”. Any
questions?
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FOURTH PART OF THE EXPERIMENT
In the fourth part of the experiment, you make 30 decisions. You have to choose
30 times between Option A and Option B. Under Option A, you will receive a secure
payment that starts with 0 points in the first decision round and increases to 400
points in the last decision round. Under Option B you will receive a lottery. In the
lottery, you get with 50% probability either 100 points or 400 points. The lottery is
in all 30 decisions the same.
We pay one of the 30 decisions, which is chosen randomly. You confirm your 30
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decisions with the OK button. Do you have any questions?
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Chapter 3
Auctions with Loss Averse Bidders
3.1 Introduction
Since Kahneman and Tversky (1979), loss aversion and reference dependent prefer-
ences have been applied to a variety of empirical and theoretical economic problems.
When applying models of loss aversion, the modeller is required to decide over what
individuals have feelings of gains and losses. This is the problem of narrow versus
wide bracketing. To illustrate the problem, consider the series of experiments con-
ducted by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990), who study the endowment effect
in competitive markets. When subjects are given actual goods, the endowment effect
has an impact on trading volumes; if, however, subjects are endowed with money
rather than a good, they observe no endowment effect. The explanation given is
that when trading money for coffee mugs, there is a friction caused by a loss in one
and a gain in the other dimension. When money is traded for money, this friction
disappears. Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) propose a model which rationalizes the experi-
mental findings mentioned, using the concept of consumption dimensions, over which
individuals have gain loss utility in an additively separable manner. Applying the
model of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), we derive the equilibrium bidding behavior
in the first price auction (FPA) and in the all pay auction (APA) for general environ-
ments with independent private values (IPV). In addition, we study the behavioral
implications of loss aversion on bidding strategies, and compare the revenue across
auction formats. In one specification, we consider gains and losses in two dimensions
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separately, about whether they receive the object or not, and how much they pay.
In the other specification, we consider gains and losses over the entire risk neutral
payoff, i.e. the valuation less the bid. The first specification represents narrow brack-
eting, while the second one represents wide bracketing. With one dimension, we show
that the expected revenue for the auctioneer is higher in the FPA than in the APA,
and with two dimensions, we show that the opposite is true for the revenue ranking
between the FPA and the all pay auction.
In order to test the theoretical predictions, we conduct laboratory experiments,
in which either money or a real object is auctioned in both a FPA and an APA. We
find that in both settings, the average revenue is significantly higher in the first price
auction, suggesting that bidders may behave according to the one dimensional model,
although a real object is auctioned. Whereas our findings are inconsistent with the
two dimensional model, they are consistent with the one dimensional model.
The paper contributes to the literature on loss aversion and reference depen-
dent preferences in several ways. Comparing our results to the ones in Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1990), we conclude that whether individuals do a narrow or a
wide form bracketing of gains and losses depends on the environment under consider-
ation. While competitive markets and auctions are similar in many ways, the degree
of uncertainty is a lot higher in auctions. Additionally, we provide an estimate for the
ratio of marginal disutility of losses to marginal utility of gains of 1.42, using the gen-
eralized method of moments for the data obtained in the induced value experiments.
Furthermore, we show that when applying the Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007) model, the
theoretical predictions depend crucially on the modeller’s decision how to define the
consumption dimensions over which individuals experience gains and losses.
Finally, our experimental data shows that there is no measurable difference be-
tween auctioning an actual good or simply money in auctions with induced valuation.
This result is important from a methodological view for experimenters that choose
to conduct auction experiments in the laboratory or in the field.
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3.1.1 Related Literature
Auction Theory and Risk Preferences
Riley and Samuelson (1981), Maskin and Riley (1984), Matthews (1987), and Fibich,
Gavious, and Sela (2006) study the implications of risk averse bidders in auction
settings. Lange and Ratan (2010) consider the case of loss averse bidders for the
FPA and the Vickrey auction and show that the FPA yields higher expected revenue
than the Vickrey auction, independent of whether bidders consider gambles in one
or two dimensions. Shunda (2010) shows that under a different notion of reference
dependence, the auctioneer can increase his expected revenue by introducing a buy
now price. In the present paper, we focus on a specific class of hybrid auctions, incor-
porating both the FPA and the APA, and study the bidders’ behavior and revenue
(non) equivalence across different auction formats. Furthermore, while the revenue
ranking of the FPA and the Vickrey auction in both models is the same (Lange and
Ratan (2010)), our analysis provides another testable implication of reference depen-
dence with revenue data alone. Using a general mechanism design approach in the
spirit of Myerson (1981), Eisenhuth (2012) shows that in the one dimensional model,
the FPA maximizes the expected revenue among all efficient auctions, and that in the
two dimensional model, any optimal auction is fully all pay. In light of these results,
we focus on the optimal auction (in the class of efficient auctions) in each case when
considering the FPA and the APA.
Experimental Economics
The empirical literature on the APA is small, as it is not a commonly used auction
format. To the best of our knowledge, Noussair and Silver (2006) provide the only
empirical analysis comparing the APA and the FPA in a laboratory setting with in-
dependent private values. They replicate the environment in Cox, Smith, and Walker
(1982) and Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1988), who study the FPA, and compare the
revenue data from these studies to their revenue data on the APA. Their finding
is that the APA yields significantly higher revenue than the FPA. One confounding
effect is that they provide subjects with an initial endowment of nearly seven times
as much as Cox, Smith, and Walker (1982) and Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1988).
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Thereby, Noussair and Silver (2006) lose some control over their data comparison
Furthermore, they observe bids of 0 for the lowest types in either auction format.
Real object auctions are not studied. Lucking-Reiley (1999) studies real object field
auctions using the FPA, the Vickrey auction, the English auction, and the Dutch
auction with Magic cards and refutes revenue equivalence; an analysis of the APA
is missing. Moreover, as the data are collected through online auctions, bidders do
not know how many opponents they are facing in the auction. We contribute to the
experimental literature by studying revenue equivalence between the APA and the
FPA, explicitly differentiating between auctioning money and an actual object.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Preferences
We consider two different specifications of reference dependent preferences. The first
one is a specification according to which the bidders consider gambles for the object
and money separately; the second specification treats the difference between the
valuation for the object and the amount paid as one dimension, and gambles are
evaluated over this difference only. As proposed in Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006), the
first specification of bidders’ preferences is given by
u(cg, cm|rg, rm, θ) := θcg + cm︸ ︷︷ ︸
intrinsic utility
+ ηgµg(θ(cg − rg)) + ηmµm(cm − rm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain loss utility
,
where cg, rg ∈ {0, 1} captures the good dimension, cm, rm ∈ R captures the money
dimension. For l ∈ {g,m}, cl is true consumption, rl is the reference level of con-
sumption, ηl > 0, measures the weight attached to gain loss utility in dimension l,
and θ ≥ 0 is the bidder’s intrinsic valuation for the good. The second specification is
given by
u(cg, cm|rg, rm, θ) := θcg + cm︸ ︷︷ ︸
intrinsic utility
+ ηµ(θcg + cm − (θrg + rm))︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain loss utility
.
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Moreover,
µl(x) :=
 x, if x ≥ 0λlx, if x < 0,
where λl > 1, l ∈ {g,m}, and the second specification with only one dimension is
implied when the index on the parameters is suppressed. These preferences capture
loss aversion through the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) value function, µl, l ∈
{g,m}. A deviation from the reference point is disliked more if it is a loss than it is
liked if it is a gain.
3.2.2 Auction Rules
A single, indivisible object is sold among N ≥ 2 loss averse bidders who share the
same ηl and λl, l ∈ {g,m}, and whose valuations, {θi}Ni=1, are the realizations of N
independent draws from the continuous distribution function, F : Θ → [0, 1], where
Θ := [θmin, θmax] ⊂ R+, with strictly positive density everywhere. The valuation of
bidder i, θi, is bidder i’s private information. The bidders and the auctioneer share the
same prior beliefs. We consider the following class of auctions with all pay component,
α ∈ [0, 1]. Bidders simultaneously submit their bid, and the bidder with the highest
bid wins the object and pays his entire bid. All other bidders walk away without the
object but have to pay α of their bid. In case of a winning tie, the winner is selected
among the highest bidders with equal probability. For α = 0, we have the FPA and
for α = 1, the APA. This formulation, incorporating both the APA and the FPA,
appears first in Siegel (2010). Other common auction formats, as, for instance, the
Vickrey auction are excluded from our analysis, partially because Lange and Ratan
(2010) study the Vickrey auction in the same setting and partially because Eisenhuth
(2012) shows that this is without loss of generality, using a general mechanism design
approach in the spirit of Myerson (1981). In our theoretical analysis, we focus on
symmetric equilibrium bidding functions.
3.2.3 Solution Concept
In the above described auction setting, each bidder learns his valuation before sub-
mitting his bid and therefore, maximizes his interim expected utility. Using Ko¨szegi
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and Rabin (2006)’s notation, if the distribution of reference points is G, and the dis-
tribution of actual consumption outcomes is H, the decision maker’s interim expected
utility is given by
U(H|G, θ) :=
ˆ
{(cg ,cm)}
ˆ
{(rg ,rm)}
u(cg, cm|rg, rm, θ)dG(rg, rm|θ)dH(cg, cm|θ).
Definition 1. (Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007)) Conditional on the realization of the
type, θ, for any choice set, D, H ∈ D is an interim CPE if U(H|H, θ) ≥ U(H ′|H ′, θ),
for all H ′ ∈ D.
Fixing all other bidders’ behavior, each bidder’s bid, bi, induces a distribution,
Hi(A|bi, b−i), over the set of alternatives, A := {0, 1}N×RN . Therefore, the definition
can be modified in the following way to match the auction setting under consideration.
Definition 2. Conditional on the realization of the type, θi, b : Θ → R+ is a
symmetric interim CPE bidding function if for all i, θi, θ−i, b′ ≥ 0,
U
(
Hi(A|b(θi), b−i = b(θ−i))|Hi(A|b(θi), b−i = b(θ−i)), θi
)
≥ U (Hi(A|b′, b−i = b(θ−i))|Hi(A|b′, b−i = b(θ−i)), θi) .
The interpretation of CPE is that each bidder understands that once consumption
occurs, i.e. once the auction is over, he evaluates this consumption outcome against
the actual lottery as his reference lottery. As laid out in Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007),
CPE is the most appropriate solution concept for decisions under risk, whose uncer-
tainty is resolved long after the decision is made. An alternative solution concept,
choice unacclimating personal equilibrium (UPE), requires the decision to be optimal,
given the expectations at the time the decision is made. Below we show that UPE
is equivalent to CPE in the auction setting under consideration. This equivalence,
however, cannot be generalized to other setting, as documented by Ko¨szegi and Rabin
(2007). We will state all formal results using CPE, but show that replacing CPE by
UPE, the validity of all results is retained. For the following analysis, it is convenient
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to define Λl := ηl(λl − 1) > 0, l ∈ {g,m}, which can be viewed as an overall measure
of the degree of loss aversion in the respective dimension. The following assumption,
as proven in the Appendix 3.A, guarantees that all bidders participate in the auction
for any realization of their own type, and that their equilibrium bidding functions
derived below are strictly increasing.
Assumption 1. (No Dominance of Gain Loss Utility) Λg ≤ 1.
This assumption places, for a given η (λ), an upper bound on λ (η). In Herweg,
Mu¨ller, and Weinschenk (2010), this assumption is referred to as no dominance of gain
loss utility. In the following, we consider each specification of reference dependent
preferences, one and two dimensional, at a time.
3.3 Analysis
3.3.1 Two Dimensions
Consider the ex post utility of bidder i when his bid is x, and x−i is the vector
of all other bidders’ bids. Let qi(x) = P (i wins |x, x−i) = P (x > maxj 6=i{xj}) be
the probability that bidder i wins the auction, conditional on his own and all other
bidders’ bids. When he ends up with the object and pays x, his utility is
θi − x︸ ︷︷ ︸
intrinsic utility
+ ηg
(
1− qi(x)
)
θi − ηmλm
(
1− qi(x)
)
(1− α)x︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain loss utility
.
The first term represents intrinsic utility, and the second term captures gain loss
utility. Compared to the situation in which the bidder does not win the auction, which
happens with probability (1 − qi(x)), he experiences a gain in the good dimension
and a loss in the money dimension. In case bidder i ends up without the object and
his bid is x, his utility is
−αx︸︷︷︸
intrinsic utility
+ ηgλgqi(x)(−θi) + ηmqi(x)(1− α)x︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain loss utility
,
since, compared to the situation in which he wins the auction, which happens
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with probability, qi(x), this is considered a loss in the good dimension and a gain in
the money dimension. Therefore, bidder i’s interim expected utility is
qi(x)
(
θi − x+ ηg
(
1− qi(x)
)
θi − ηmλm
(
1− qi(x)
)
(1− α)x
)
+
(
1− qi(x)
) (−αx− ηgλgqi(x)θi + ηmqi(x)(1− α)x) .
By varying their bid, x, each bidder changes the probability of winning, and
therefore his reference lottery. We look for strictly increasing, symmetric equilibrium
bidding functions. Hence, dropping the i subscript, the bidder’s program is
V (θ) := max
x∈R+
{
q(x)
(
θ − x+ ηg (1− q(x)) θ − ηmλm (1− q(x)) (1− α)x)
+
(
1− q(x)) (−αx− ηgλgq(x)θ + ηmq(x)(1− α)x)}
= FN−1(θ)
(
1− Λg
(
1− FN−1(θ)
))
θ
−FN−1(θ)
(
1 + Λm
(
1− FN−1(θ)
))
(1− α)bα(θ)− αbα(θ), (3.1)
where the ultimate equality follows from independence of the types, bα being
strictly increasing (and hence, invertible), and the definition of Λl, l ∈ {g,m}. Since,
V (θmin) = 0, applying the envelope theorem yields the following expression for the
symmetric CPE bidding function:
bα(θ) =
β(θ)θ − ´ θ
θmin
β(s)ds
(1− α)FN−1(θ)∆(θ) + α,
where ∆(θ) := (1+Λm(1−FN−1(θ))) ≥ 1 and β(θ) := FN−1(θ)
(
1− Λg (1− FN−1(θ))).
Furthermore, by the envelope theorem, the bidder’s payoff is independent of the auc-
tion format, α, and depends, as in the risk neutral case, only on the probability of
winning the auction.
Proposition 1. Suppose assumption 1 holds. Then, bα(θ) is strictly increasing, for
almost all θ and constitutes the unique symmetric pure strategy CPE bidding function.
Proposition 1 and all formal results which follow are proven in the Appendix
3.A. In order to study the equilibrium bidding behavior of loss averse bidders, it
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is instructive to first consider the case in which bidders are only loss averse in the
money dimension (Λm > 0) and risk neutral in the good dimension (Λg = 0). Letting
bRNα denote the equilibrium bidding function with risk neutral bidders in the same
environment, the CPE bidding function then reads
bα(θ) =
1
ψα(θ)
bRNα (θ),
where
ψα(θ) :=
(1− α)FN−1(θ)∆(θ) + α
(1− α)FN−1(θ) + α ≥ 1.
If bidders only have gain loss considerations in the money dimension, then the
equilibrium bid is the distorted risk neutral bid. Regarding the comparative statics
results with respect to the parameter, Λm, the following result holds.
Proposition 2. bα(θ) is strictly decreasing in Λ
m, for almost all θ, for all α ∈ [0, 1).
For α = 1, Λm has no effect on bα(θ), for all θ.
In order to see the behind of this result, consider the FPA (α = 0). As above,
let q(x) be the probability of winning the object when submitting a bid of x. In
case he wins, a bidder pays x which is a loss of x relative to paying nothing (in
case he loses). This loss sensation is weighted with the probability of not having
to pay, which is (1 − q(x)) since the reference point is formed at the interim stage.
Since a bidder wins with probability q(x), from an interim perspective, this feeling
of loss occurs with probability q(x), and thus there is an interim expected loss of
ηmλmq(x)(1−q(x))x. Likewise, in the event of losing, a bidder considers the bid saved
a gain of x in the money dimension, and the outcome of winning is weighted with q(x)
in the reference lottery. Furthermore, from an interim perspective, a bidder expects
to lose with probability (1− q(x)) so his interim expected gain is ηmq(x)(1− q(x))x.
Consequently, the overall expected gain loss sensation is ηm(λm − 1)q(x)(1− q(x))x,
and since losses loom larger than gains (λm > 1), this is always negative when there
are multiple monetary outcomes. Hence, a bidder’s interim benefit of winning is
less and hence, in equilibrium, this lowers the bidders’ bids relative to the APA,
in which payments are certain from an interim perspective. More specifically, the
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reduction in interim expected payoff consists of three parts, the overall degree of loss
aversion, ηm(λm − 1) = Λm, the variance of the Bernoulli distributed outcome of
winning or losing the auction, q(x)(1 − q(x)), and the wedge between the amount
paid when winning and losing. Since the last part is identical to 0 in the APA,
gain loss considerations have no effect on the interim expected payoff, whereas for all
α ∈ [0, 1), the payoff is reduced. In a symmetric equilibrium, the interim probability
of winning and receiving the good is the same across auction formats, in particular,
q(x) = FN−1(θ), and therefore, does not affect the comparison across auction formats.
In order to examine how loss aversion in the good dimension affects the bidding
behavior, consider the case in which 1 ≥ Λg > 0 and Λm = 0. Then, the equilibrium
bidding function is given by bα(θ) = (1− Λg)bRNα (θ) + Λgκα(θ), where
κα(θ) :=
F 2(N−1)(θ)θ − ´ θ
θmin
FN−1(s)ds
(1− α)FN−1(θ) + α .
The following proposition summarizes the impact of loss aversion in the good
dimension on the equilibrium bid.
Proposition 3. If 0 < Λg ≤ 1 and Λm = 0, there is a unique interior threshold, θ¯,
such that bα(θ) is strictly decreasing in Λ
g, for almost all θ < θ¯, and strictly increasing
in Λg, for all θ > θ¯ α ∈ [0, 1].
To see the intuition behind this result, again, let q(x) be the interim probability
of winning. Then, from an interim perspective, expected gain loss utility in the good
dimension is −ηg(λg − 1)q(x)(1 − q(x))θ. As above, the variance of the Bernoulli
distributed outcome of winning or losing the auction reduces the interim expected
payoff. This implies that the loss is maximized at q(x) = 1/2, and minimized at
q(x) = 0 and q(x) = 1. Hence, whenever q(x) is less than 1/2 a bidder has an
incentive to lower q(x) in order to reduce this feeling of loss while whenever q(x) is
greater than 1/2 he has an incentive to increase q(x) in order to lower this feeling
of loss. Of course, in equilibrium, the probability of winning for a bidder is the
probability that he is the highest type, which is unaffected by loss aversion. Therefore,
loss aversion in the good dimension increases the bid of the highest types and reduces
the bid of the lowest types through an indirect effect caused by this preference for
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Figure 3.1: FPA and APA with Λg = 1, Λm = 1, N = 2, and θ ∼ U [0, 1].
certain outcomes. Figure 3.1 depicts the equilibrium bidding functions for N = 2 and
θ ∼ U [0, 1], compared to the same situation with risk neutral bidders (Λg = Λm = 0).
In the APA, the bidding functions with risk neutrality and loss aversion in the money
dimension coincide (the dashed line in the right panel of Figure 3.1).
So far, it has been assumed that assumption 1 is satisfied. As Lange and Ratan
(2010) show, if assumption 1 is not met, there are some bidders who choose to not
participate in the auction and submit a bid of 0. The argument is that by choosing a
bid of 0, a bidder can secure himself a payoff of 0. However, if a set of types of strictly
positive measure bid 0, then these types tie at 0 and win with positive probability.
Taking into account the ties at 0, the implications of a violation of assumption 1 are
the following.
Proposition 4. Suppose assumption 1 does not hold, i.e. Λg > 1. Then, in
the unique symmetric pure strategy CPE, there is a unique interior threshold, θˆ ∈
(θmin, θmax), given by F
N−1(θˆ) = (Λg − 1)/Λg, such that for all θ ≥ θˆ,
bα(θ) =
β(θ)θ − ´ θ
θˆ
β(s)ds
(1− α)FN−1(θ)∆(θ) + α,
and for all for all θ < θˆ, bα(θ) = 0, for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Additionally, θˆ is strictly
increasing in Λg and the number of bidders, N .
This result indicates that when loss aversion in the good dimension is too pro-
nounced, there is a set of types of strictly positive measure, for which it is not optimal
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Figure 3.2: APA with Λg = 2, N = 2, and θ ∼ U [0, 1].
to submit a positive bid. The cut off point, θˆ, is identical across all auction formats,
α ∈ [0, 1]. If bidders are given the option of not participating in the auction, with
a certain payoff of 0, the cut off in the above proposition changes, but the analysis
remains the same. In fact, the cut off with the option of non participation is obtained
as the cut off in proposition 4, as N → ∞, since the probability of winning with a
winning tie at 0 goes to 0 as the number of bidders increases, and when not partici-
pating, the probability of winning is 0, as well. As argued above, the variance of the
Bernoulli distributed outcome of winning or losing the auction reduces the equilib-
rium payoff. The above result says that, depending on the value of Λg, this reduction
can be too pronounced to make bidding a positive amount worth while for the lowest
types, since they have the lowest information rents to start with. If loss aversion is
very pronounced (Λg > 1), it is not profitable for the bidders at the bottom of the
distribution to take the risk of submitting a positive bid. Loss averse bidders prefer
certain outcomes. If gain loss utility dominates intrinsic utility (Λg > 1), then the
lowest types have to be compensated for taking the risk associated with participating
in the auction, which translates into the non negativity constraint on the submitted
bid to be binding for these types. Figure 3.2 depicts the equilibrium bidding function
for the APA in the setting of the previous example in Figure 3.1 if assumption 1 is
violated (Λg = Λm = 2).
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3.3.2 One Dimension
Similar to the considerations in the previous subsection, with only one dimension, a
bidder of type θ solves
V (θ) := max
x∈R+
{
q(x)
(
θ − x+ η (1− q(x)) (θ − x(1− α)))
+
(
1− q(x)) (−αx− ηλq(x)(θ − (1− α)x))}
= FN−1(θ)
(
1− Λ
(
1− FN−1(θ)
))
θ
−FN−1(θ)
(
1− Λ
(
1− FN−1(θ)
))
(1− α)bα(θ)− αbα(θ). (3.2)
Application of the envelope theorem yields the following expression for the symmetric
CPE bidding function.
bα(θ) =
β(θ)θ − ´ θ
θmin
β(s)ds
(1− α)β(θ) + α ,
where β(θ) is as defined above. Analogous to the case with two dimensions, the
following results hold for one dimensional reference dependence.
Proposition 5. Suppose assumption 1 holds. Then, bα(θ) is strictly increasing, for
almost all θ and constitutes the unique symmetric pure strategy CPE bidding function.
Proposition 6. Suppose assumption 1 does not hold, i.e. Λ > 1. Then, in the unique
symmetric pure strategy CPE, there is a unique interior threshold, θˆ ∈ (θmin, θmax),
given by FN−1(θˆ) = (Λ− 1)/Λ, such that for all θ ≥ θˆ,
bα(θ) =
β(θ)θ − ´ θ
θˆ
β(s)ds− β(θˆ)θˆ
(1− α)β(θ) + α ,
and for all θ < θˆ, bα(θ) = 0, for all α ∈ (0, 1], and bα(θ) = θ, for α = 0. Additionally,
θˆ is strictly increasing in Λ and the number of bidders, N .
For all auctions which are not an FPA, the above result is essentially identical to
the two dimensional model, and the intuition from above applies. For the FPA, the
intuition is now different. Whereas in the two dimensional model and for all auctions
with α ∈ (0, 1], there is no possibility for the bidders to secure themselves a payoff
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Figure 3.3: FPA and APA with Λ = 1, N = 2, and θ ∼ U [0, 1].
of 0, there is in the FPA, which can be achieved by always bidding the value, θ, so
that the ex post payoff is 0, and therefore, also the expected payoff. Regarding the
comparative statics properties with respect to the parameter, Λ, the following result
holds, as an analogue to propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 7. If α = 1 and 0 < Λ ≤ 1, there is a unique interior threshold, θ¯, such
that bα(θ) is strictly decreasing in Λ, for almost all θ < θ¯, and strictly increasing in
Λ, for all θ > θ¯. If α = 0, bα(θ) is strictly increasing in Λ, for almost all θ.
As argued above, loss averse bidders exhibit an aversion to the variance and the
wedge between the payoff when winning and losing, θ− x and −αx. In the FPA, the
wedge between the payoff when winning and losing decreases if the bid increases. This
effect drives bidders to increase their bid when the degree of loss aversion increases.
Since the CPE bidding function is continuous in α, the above result implies that for
auctions with a low enough all pay component, the higher the degree of loss aversion,
the higher the bid. Overbidding behavior is observed in the experimental literature
(e.g. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) and Noussair and Silver (2006)). In the APA, the
bid is always paid for sure, and due to the linearity of the Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) value function, does not enter the bidders’ gain loss considerations, so that
the intuition from proposition 3 applies. Figure 3.3 shows the CPE bidding function
in the same environment as the previous examples.
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3.3.3 Relationship between CPE and UPE
As mentioned above, in the auction setting under consideration, CPE and UPE are
equivalent. For convenience, we first state the definition of UPE.
Definition 3. (Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006)) Conditional on the realization of the
type, θ, for any choice set, D, H ∈ D is an interim CPE if U(H|H, θ) ≥ U(H ′|H, θ),
for all H ′ ∈ D.
In CPE, the bidder picks a lottery which maximizes his expected payoff taking
into account that his reference lottery adjusts accordingly; in UPE, given a reference
lottery, the bidder needs to be willing to pick this very lottery. While the interpre-
tation of CPE and UPE is different, every CPE can be supported as a UPE in the
auction setting under consideration. In order to see this, suppose that each bidder has
some reference lottery, say H. Given this reference lottery, each bidder maximizes his
expected payoff by submitting a bid. The essence of the argument involves noticing
that given the reference lottery, maximizing the expected payoff over the submitted
bid leads to a probability of winning of FN−1(θ), just as in CPE. More specifically,
for any reference lottery, each bidder’s payoff maximizing probability of winning is
FN−1(θ). In UPE, both lotteries have to coincide, so that H = FN−1(θ).
3.3.4 Revenue Non Equivalence
In this section, we compare the expected ex ante revenue for the auctioneer across
auction formats. Since the results depend on whether the two or one dimensional
model is applied, the revenue properties are discussed separately.
Two Dimensions
As seen above, the interim expected payoff of a bidder of type θ is identical across
auction formats. Hence, gain loss considerations in the good dimension leave the
interim expected payoff unaffected across auction formats. By proposition 2, each
bidder’s bid is reduced by loss aversion in the money dimension if α < 1; if α = 1, then
loss aversion in the money dimension has no effect on the equilibrium bid. Hence, for
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α = 1, bidders bid as if they are risk neutral in the money dimension. Consequently,
the interim expected payment of each bidder is reduced by loss aversion in the money
dimension if α < 1, so revenue equivalence breaks down, as summarized by the
following propositions.
Proposition 8. If bidders are loss averse in the money dimension (Λm > 0), the
expected revenue for the auctioneer is strictly increasing in α.
Gain loss considerations in the money dimension distort the equilibrium bid down-
wards. By requiring bidders to pay their bid regardless of whether they win the object
or not, gain loss distortions in the money dimension are minimized. If α < 1, loss
averse bidders realize gains in the money dimension if they lose, and losses if they win.
Since, under loss aversion, losses loom larger than gains, bidders bid more hesitantly
in any auction with α < 1 than in the APA. Therefore, among all auctions with fixed
all pay component, α, the APA maximizes the auctioneer’s expected revenue. In
addition, payoff equivalence implies that loss aversion in the good dimension is irrel-
evant for the revenue ranking across auction formats, as summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 9. If bidders are loss averse in the good dimension and risk neutral in
the money dimension (Λg > 0,Λm = 0), the expected revenue for the auctioneer is
identical, for all α ∈ [0, 1].
This result confirms that the revenue ranking across auction formats is solely
driven by loss aversion in the money dimension. An immediate implication is that the
revenue ranking is unaffected by whether assumption 1 is met or not. Furthermore,
as the bidders’ payoff depends solely on the allocation rule, the above results imply
the inefficiency of any auction that is not an APA if Λm > 0, since when increasing
α bidders remain indifferent, but the auctioneer strictly gains.
One Dimension
As in the two dimensional model, the interim expected payoff for each bidder is iden-
tical across auction formats. Consider the payoff from (3.2), which can be rewritten
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as
V (θ) = FN−1(θ)θ −
(
FN−1(θ)(1− α) + α
)
− ΛFN−1(θ)
(
1− FN−1(θ)
) (
θ − (1− α)bα(θ)
)
.
Similar to the case with two dimensions, the bidder’s payoff is reduced by the
variance of the Bernoulli distributed outcome of winning and losing the auction, the
degree of loss aversion, and the wedge between the payoff when winning and losing,
θ−(1−α)bα(θ). The bidder’s objective function satisfies strictly increasing differences
in (α,−x), so that bα(θ) is non increasing in α, for all θ. Increasing α lowers the
bidder’s bid, since an increased fraction is paid for sure. In addition, keeping the
(non negative) bid fixed, increasing α leads to an increase in the wedge between the
payoff when winning and losing. Both of these effects reduce the bidder’s payoff.
Since the payoff is determined by the allocation rule alone, this payoff reduction is
compensated for by bidding less aggressively in the APA compared to the FPA, so
that the following result holds.
Proposition 10. If Λ > 0, the expected revenue for the auctioneer is strictly de-
creasing in α.
3.3.5 Risk Aversion or Loss Aversion?
A natural question to ask is whether the results derived above are driven by risk
aversion rather than loss aversion. Auctions with risk averse bidders are studied in
Riley and Samuelson (1981), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Matthews (1987), where
bidders’ preferences take the form u(θ,−x), and u is strictly increasing and strictly
concave in both arguments. As a special case of this formulation, which is studied in
Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006), bidders’ preferences take the form, u(θ− x), where
u is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006) com-
pare the expected revenue in the APA and the FPA. Their finding is that the revenue
ranking is ambiguous in the sense that there are utility functions and distributions for
which either the APA or the FPA yields higher expected revenue for the auctioneer.
Maskin and Riley (1984) study optimal auctions with risk averse bidders. They find
that a perfect insurance auction is optimal with homogeneously risk averse bidders,
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who differ only in their type, θ. A perfect insurance auction is an auction with two
payment schemes, one for bidders who win the auction, xW , and one for bidders who
lose the auction, xL, that depend on the reported type, but are deterministic other-
wise, and have the property that for highest type, the marginal utility of money is
identical in each state. The APA is nested in the class of perfect insurance auctions,
for xW = xL, and the FPA is nested for xL = 0. The results in Maskin and Riley
(1984) imply that a necessary condition for the APA (xW = xL) to yield the highest
expected revenue for the auctioneer is that the marginal utility of money is indepen-
dent of the valuation, θ, e.g. u(θ,−x) = θ−m(x). Furthermore, the insights obtained
by Maskin and Riley (1984) rationalize the ambiguous revenue ranking between the
APA and the FPA reported in Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006). Furthermore, every
risk averse bidder with the above preferences is locally risk neutral, which implies
that every risk averse bidder participates in the auction and submits a positive bid,
because he obtains non negative expected payoff from doing so. As seen above, this
is not necessarily the case if bidders are loss averse. This raises the question whether
the limited participation results derived above for high degrees of loss aversion in
the good dimension can be explained by first order risk aversion. If bidders have
rank dependent expected utility preferences as in Yaari (1987), which allow for first
order risk aversion, the revenue ranking and the participation is as with additively
separable risk aversion1, i.e. the APA yields the highest revenue for the auctioneer.
3.4 Experiment
As seen above, the revenue ranking between the FPA and the APA is opposite in the
one and two dimensional model. In this section, we describe the experiments, which
are designed to test the theoretical results derived above and which contribute to
a better understaning of methodological robustness concerning laboratory and field
experiments. A common method in experimental economics to analyze IPV auctions
is the induced value (IV) method, where money is auctioned. Bidders are assigned a
randomly drawn valuation, and if they win, they receive a monetary payoff equal to
their valuation. This is in contrast to a real object (RO) auction, where actual goods
1The results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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are auctioned. Since money is auctioned in the IV method, only the one dimensional
model is applicable in this setting; for RO auctions, the two dimensional model is
more plausible. Therefore, we examine revenue equivalence between the APA and
the FPA for RO and IV auctions separately and compare the results of the IV and
RO method. Based on the theoretical results above, we seek to test the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. IV Auction: The expected revenue is higher for the FPA than for the
APA (Proposition 10).
Hypothesis 2. IV Auction: Almost every bidder submits a positive bid in the FPA,
but not necessarily in the APA (Proposition 6).
Hypothesis 3. RO Auction: The expected revenue is higher for the APA than for
the FPA (Proposition 8).
Hypothesis 4. RO Auction: The fraction of bidders submitting zero bids is identical
in the APA and in the FPA (Proposition 4).
Two of the above hypotheses can be tested with revenue data alone; the other two
require data on the bidders’ behavior. The ability to test using revenue data alone
is due to the diverging revenue rankings in the one and two dimensional model of
reference dependence for the APA and the FPA. Comparing the FPA to the Vickrey
auction, Lange and Ratan (2010) find that the theoretical revenue ranking is identical
in the one and two dimensional model, so one can only reject (or not reject) both
models together when using revenue data.
3.4.1 Experimental Design
In order to experimentally test our hypotheses, we employ two different methodolog-
ical approaches. Both approaches are run in the laboratory instead of in the field
to contribute to the analysis of auctions with experimental methods. For the IV
method, subjects were anonymously matched into groups of three. Each subject was
given an endowment of 700 points, where 100 points are worth 1e, which was $1.42
at that time, to submit a bid in the auction. Subjects’ valuations in the auction were
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independently drawn from the uniform distribution on {0, 1, 2, . . . , 299, 300}, which
was made common knowledge to the subjects. The maximum valuation is therefore
300 points and lower than the endowment. Bids were allowed to have up to two dec-
imal points, e.g. 2.99, as we did not want bidders with low valuations to floor their
bids down to zero, which would inhibit the testability of our hypothesis on limited
participation. The important part of the design of the induced value method is the
following. Subjects were provided with a list of ten different valuations, such that a
subject participated in ten auctions. The subjects had to bid for each valuation, how-
ever only one of the ten auctions was payoff relevant, and each auction was equally
likely to be payoff relevant. We adapted this procedure from Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay
(2007). Figure 3.6 in the Appendix 3.B shows an example of such a list. In the FPA,
the subject with the highest bid in the group of three won the auction and received
the valuation plus the endowment minus the respective bid as his or her payoff. If
more than one subject was the highest bidder, the computer chose the winner with
equal probability. The other subjects lost the auction and received only the endow-
ment. The rules of the APA were exactly the same, except for the losers’ payoff,
which was the endowment minus the bid. Finally, to secure the understanding of
the game, we asked several control questions (see Appendix 3.B). In the RO auction,
we auctioned a real good. The good was chosen, such that subjects valuations do
not largely differ from the induced value auction, and are plausibly independent and
private. Therefore, we decided to auction a blackboard cup with a piece of chalk. The
cup has a blackboard sheathing, on which can be written with chalk (see Figure 3.5
in Appendix 3.B). Every subject had the possibility to have a look at the cup before
bidding in the auction. The buying price of the cup was 1.75 euros, which was not
revealed to the subjects. As in the IV auction, subjects received an initial endowment
of 700 points before the auction began. In contrast to the IV auction, each subject
can only take part in one RO auction. The rules of the auction formats are the same
as in the IV method. The IV auction and the RO auction were played on different
days with different subjects in the BonnEconLab at the University of Bonn with 192
participants from various fields of study, recruited via ORSEE Greiner (2004), out
of which 96 subjects participated in the IV auction and 96 in the RO auction. The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree by Fischbacher
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(2007).
3.4.2 Results
Result 1. The average revenue for the FPA is significantly greater than for the APA,
for both the IV and the RO auction.
A group of three subjects bids in one auction. Since 24 subjects are in one session,
we have eight groups per session. In the induced value method, each subject had to
submit ten bids for ten valuations. Thus, each group performs ten auctions and we
receive ten revenues per group. We take the average of the respective ten revenues
of one group as an independent observation and therefore use 8 independent revenue
observations per session for the data analysis. The average revenue in the IV method
for the FPA is 170 points and 152 points in the APA. Summary statistics of the data
collected are shown in Table 3.1. We will use t-tests to show whether this sizeable
difference in means is also significant. Performing a one sided t-test, we reject the
hypothesis that the average revenues are equal in favor of the alternative hypothesis
that the average revenue of the FPA is greater than the average revenue of the APA
with p = 0.04, which confirms our Hypothesis 1, that the revenue of the FPA is
larger than of the APA.2 The results are similar in the RO auction, with an even
larger difference in average revenue, which is 263 points for the FPA and 150 points
for the APA. Therefore, our data does not confirm Hypothesis 2, that the opposite
should occur when bidders think in two dimensions. Using a two sided t-test rejects
the hypothesis that average revenues are equal with a p − value = 0.03. For the IV
auction, the results are consistent with the model of one dimensional reference depen-
dence. In the RO auction, the results reject the model of two dimensional reference
dependence, yet are consistent with the one dimensional model. One possible expla-
nation for this is that although a real object is auctioned, subjects behave according
to the one dimensional model of reference dependence.
2The p-value of a two sided t-test is 0.08.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Induced Value Auction Real Object Auction
Mean Std. Dev. N Zero Bids Mean Std. Dev. N Zero Bids
FPA 170 29.8 16 2.5 % 263 150 16 8.3 %
APA 152 26.5 16 27.7 % 150 129 16 39.6 %
N is the number of independent valuations
Result 2. The fraction of bidders submitting zero bids is significantly greater in
the APA than in the FPA, for both the IV and the RO auction.
A strikingly large amount of subjects submits a bid of zero in the APA, 27.7% in
the IV auction and 39.6 % in the RO and only 2.5% and 8.3% respectively for the
FPA. Using a t-test, we find that zero bids occur significant more often in the APA
compared to the FPA with p < 0.01. As with the revenue data, these findings are
consistent with the one dimensional model fo reference dependence, but not with the
two dimensional one.
Structural Estimation For the Induced Value Method
The above results consider the revenue data alone. While we do not have data on
the valuations in the real object auctions, we have the induced valuations and the
submitted bids in the induced value auctions, which enables to structurally estimate
the parameter, Λ. By doing this, we can compare our estimate to the ones reported in
the literature and obtain an internal consistency check. We employ the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) using the moment conditions,
E[b0] = E[b0(θ|Λ)] and E[b1] = E[b1(θ|Λ)].
We estimate Λˆ = 0.42 with a standard error of 0.16, which is statistically different
from 0 and 1 at all conventional significance levels using a Wald test. Since we have
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Figure 3.4: Bids with GMM estimate, Λˆ = 0.42.
two moment conditions and only one parameter to estimate, we perform a J-test for
overidentifying restrictions, which does not reject the null that the model is valid at
all conventional significance levels (χ2(1) = 2.31). The following figure depicts the
predicted bids compared to the risk neutral benchmark. Recall that Λ = η(λ− 1), so
that η and λ are not identified. Once we normalize η = 1, we can identify λˆ = 1.42.
3.5 Conclusion
While the above analysis is robust to considering more general, non linear specifi-
cations of the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) value function in the two dimensional
model, the analysis becomes analytically intractable for non linear functions in the
one dimensional model. By continuity and the revenue ranking being strict, it follows
that introducing small amounts of non linearities will not change any of the above
results. However, as in Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006), no closed form expression
for the equilibrium bidding function can be obtained, and one has to resort to ap-
proximate perturbation methods. As the above analysis shows, the implications of
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bidders with reference dependent preferences in auction environments differ depend-
ing on which specification of preferences (one or two dimensional) is assumed. In a
working paper preceding their published articles, Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2004) discuss
the distinction between consumption and hedonic dimensions in their model of ref-
erence dependent preferences. The dimensions across which gambles are considered
separately are not necessarily equal to physical consumption dimensions. They give
the example of peanut butter, jelly, and bread, where one is plausibly interested only
in the total number of sandwiches produced. Which of the two specifications studied
above is more appropriate in which context demands further research. The separable
model is commonly used in applications, e.g. Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006), Heidhues
and Ko¨szegi (2008), Herweg, Mu¨ller, and Weinschenk (2010). As the above analysis
illustrates, the theoretical implications may differ drastically, depending on which
specification of reference dependent preferences is employed. Using experiments, we
can reject the two dimensional model, but not the one dimensional model.
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3.6 Appendix
Appendix 3.A
Proof of Proposition 1: If assumption 1 is satisfied, then
FN−1(θ)
(
1− Λg(1− FN−1(θ))
)
= FN−1(θ)(1− Λg) + F 2(N−1)(θ)Λg,
is strictly increasing in θ, so the payoff is strictly increasing in the type. Differentiating
bα(θ) with respect to θ gives
∂
∂θ
bα(θ) > 0⇐⇒ (1− Λg + 2FN−1(θ)Λg)θ − bα(θ)(1− α)(1 + Λm − 2ΛmFN−1(θ)) > 0.(3.3)
(3.3) is equivalent to
(1− Λg + 2FN−1(θ)Λg)FN−1(θ)θ − bα(θ)(1− α)FN−1(θ)(1 + Λm − 2ΛmFN−1(θ)) > 0
⇐⇒ β(θ)θ + ΛgFN−1(θ)− bα(θ)(1− α)FN−1(θ)(1 + Λm − ΛmFN−1(θ)) + bα(θ)ΛmFN−1(θ) > 0
⇐⇒ V (θ) + ΛgFN−1(θ) + bα(θ)ΛmFN−1(θ) > 0
which is true since, the expected payoff is positive. Additionally, since bα is strictly
increasing, the envelope representation of the bidder’s payoff applies, the type space
is convex and has no mass points, uniqueness follows from Myerson (1981). 
Proof of Proposition 2: Immediate by inspection. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
∂
∂Λg
bα(θ) = −bRNα (θ) + κα(θ) ≤ 0⇐⇒ κα(θ) ≤ bRNα (θ)
⇐⇒ F 2(N−1)(θ)θ −
ˆ θ
θmin
F 2(N−1)(s)ds ≤ FN−1(θ)θ −
ˆ θ
θmin
FN−1(s)ds.
For θ = θmin, both the LHS and the RHS of the above expression are equal to 0.
The derivative of the expression on the RHS is greater than the derivative of the
expression on the LHS if and only if FN−1(θ) ≤ 1/2, which implies that the bid of
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the lowest types is always reduced by an increase in Λg. For θ = θmax, the bidding
function is increased by an increase in Λg. 
Proof of Proposition 4: If Λg > 1, then β(θ) is minimized at FN−1(θ) = (Λg −
1)/(2Λg), since β(θ) is quadratic in FN−1(θ), so always increasing above its minimum
and decreasing below it. Therefore, β(θ) < 0, for FN−1(θ) < (Λg − 1)/Λg. These two
facts will be used in the remainder of the proof. If all θ ≤ θˆ bid 0, then they face a
probability of winning of FN−1(θˆ)/N , since FN−1(θˆ) is the probability of winning, in
which case the object is allocated among the winning bidders with equal probability.
Hence, one candidate symmetric equilibrium bidding function is bα(θ) = 0, if θ < θˆ
and
bα(θ) =
β(θ)θ − ´ θ
θˆ
β(s)ds− (θˆ − θmin)β(θˆ)− V (θmin)
α + (1− α)FN−1(θ)∆(θ) =
β(θ)θ − ´ θ
θˆ
β(s)ds− β(θˆ)θˆ
α + (1− α)FN−1(θ)∆(θ) ,
for all θ ≥ θˆ, where the last equality follows since V (θmin) = β(θˆ)θmin. Following
this strategy, all θ < θˆ receive an interim expected payoff of V (θ) = β(θˆ)θ. Since
N ≥ 2 and β(θ) is quadratic in FN−1(θ), so always decreasing below its minimum,
V (θ) = β(θˆ)θ < 0, for all θ < θˆ. Consider a deviation of a type θ < θˆ to any bid
bα(θmax) > b > 0. Then there is a θmax > θ
∗ > θˆ with bα(θ∗) = b. Hence, the payoff
from the deviation is
β(θ∗)(θ − θ∗) +
ˆ θ∗
θmin
β(s)ds+ β(θˆ)θmin = β(θ
∗)(θ − θ∗) +
ˆ θ∗
θˆ
β(s)ds+ β(θˆ)θˆ3.4)
< β(θ∗)(θ − θ∗) + (θ∗ − θˆ)β(θ∗) + β(θˆ)θˆ = β(θ∗)(θ − θˆ) + β(θˆ)θˆ (3.5)
= β(θ∗)(θ − θˆ) + β(θˆ)θˆ + β(θˆ)θ − β(θˆ)θ = (β(θ∗)− β(θˆ))(θ − θˆ) + β(θˆ)θ, (3.6)
where the above inequality follows from β(θ) being quadratic and increasing above
its minimum and N ≥ 2. The payoff from deviating is greater than the payoff from
following the strategy only if (β(θ∗)−β(θˆ))(θ− θˆ) ≥ 0, which is never satisfied, since
θ < θˆ and β(θ∗) > β(θˆ). If types above θ˜ deviate and submit a bid of 0, they earn a
payoff of β(θ˜)θ, and if they stick to the above candidate CPE strategy, they earn a
payoff of β(θ˜)θ˜+
´ θ
θ˜
β(s)ds. Since β(θ) > 0, for all θ > θ˜, a deviation is profitable only
if β(θ˜)θ˜ < β(θ˜)θ, which is never true since β(θ˜) < 0, and θ > θ˜. Finally, consider the
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threshold type, θ˜. This type is indifferent between deviating downwards or upwards,
so that there is no profitable deviation. Hence, the second candidate CPE bidding
function constitutes a symmetric pure stategy CPE. Since V (θ) ≥ 0, for all types who
submit a positive bid, the argument in the proof of proposition 2 shows that bα(θ)
is strictly increasing for all θ ≥ θˆ, so that for all θ > θ˜, Myerson (1981)’s condition
implies that the symmetric CPE bidding function is unique. Suppose that there is
another cut off with the equality defining θˆ as a strict inequality in either direction.
Then, either the types slightly above or slightly below this cut off can earn a higher
payoff by deviating to either bidding 0 or a slightly positive amount or the bidding
function is not strictly increasing, which cannot be part of a symmetric CPE. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Exactly the same as the proof of proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 6: In the one dimensional model, the analysis is different for
α ∈ (0, 1] and α = 0. Consider first all auction except the FPA and the the following
candidate symmetric equilibrium bidding function
bα(θ) =
β(θ)θ − ´ θ
θˆ
β(s)ds− (θˆ − θmin)β(θˆ)− V (θmin)
α + (1− α)FN−1(θ)∆(θ) =
β(θ)θ − ´ θ
θˆ
β(s)ds− β(θˆ)θˆ
α + (1− α)β(θ) ,
and bα(θ) = 0, for all θ < θˆ. The steps proving that this candidate CPE bidding
function constitutes the unique symmetric COPE biding function is exactly the same
as in proposition 4. Consider now the FPA. If all types below θˆ bid 0, they w=tie
and win with strictly positive probability, which yields a negative expected payoff,
since β(θ) < 0, for all θ < θˆ. Instead of bidding 0, these types can secure an expected
payoff of 0 if they bid their valuation rather than 0. Therefore, we have the following
candidate CPE bidding function,
b0(θ) = θ −
´ θ
θ˜
β(s)ds
β(θ)
,
for all θ ≥ θˆ, and b0(θ) = θ, for all θ < θˆ. By L’Hopital’s rule, limθ↓ ˆtheta = θ,
so that this candidate CPE bidding function is continuous and strictly increasing.
Uniqueness follows from Myerson (1981)’s condition. 
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Proof of Proposition 7: The first part of the proof is exactly the same as the proof
of proposition 3, the second part follows from differentiation of the bidding function
for α = 0 with respect to Λ. This expression is equal to 0 for θ = θmin, and strictly
negative for θ = θmax, in addition to being strictly decreasing in θ. 
Proof of Proposition 8: This result follows from the interim expected payoff only
depending only on the probability of winning, which is identical for a given type in
all auctions with the same allocation rule. 
Proof of Proposition 9: The expected payment, pα(θ), of a bidder of type, θ ≥ θˆ,
conditional on the other bidders’ behavior, is pα(θ) = αbα(θ) +F
N−1(θ)(1− α)bα(θ),
i.e. αbα with certainty, and (1−α)bα only if he wins, which happens with probability
FN−1(θ). Differentiating the above expression with respect to α yields
∂
∂α
pα(θ) =
FN−1(θ)(∆(θ)− 1)
(1− α)FN−1(θ)∆(θ) + αbα(θ),
which is strictly positive, for all θ > θˆ, since ∆(θ) > 1, for all θ > θˆ. For θ < θˆ,
the interim expected payment is 0 and remains unchanged in α. Since the interim
expected payment is non decreasing for all types and strictly increasing for a set of
types of strictly positive measure, this implies that the ex ante expected revenue for
the auctioneer, N
´
pα(θ)dF (θ), is strictly increasing in α. 
Proof of Proposition 10: Replace ∆ by β(θ)/FN−1(θ) in the proof of proposition 8.

Appendix 3.B
Instructions, translated into English. General instructions were identical across treat-
ments. Instructions for the real object auction and induced value auction differed.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
You are taking part in a decision-making experiment in which you have the oppor-
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tunity to earn money. The amount of money you earn is paid to you upon completion
of the experiment. Please read the instructions carefully. The instructions are iden-
tical for all participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The
experimenter will answer your question at your place. During the experiment, you
have to remain silent. Violation of this rule leads to immediate exclusion from the
experiment and all payments.
All monetary units in the experiment are measured in points, and 100 points = 1
Euro.
INSTRUCTIONS Real object auction
You now take part in an auction. For this you get an endowment of 700 points.
Task
At the beginning of the auction you will be divided into groups of three. You will
not learn who the other participants in your group are. Your task in the three-group
is that of a bidder who bids for an item in an auction. For this you can spend an
arbitrary amount of your endowment of 700 points. Your bid must have a maximum
of two decimal places.
The item
The auctioned item is a chalk-cup with one piece of chalk. The cup can always
be rewritten.
Rules
The auction rules for each three-person group are that the participant with the
highest bid wins the auction in their group and thus the cup. If several bidders have
the same highest bid, we will then toss a coin to determine the winner.
As the winner you will receive the cup, plus the endowment of 700 points minus
your bid:
Payoff = cup + 700 - your bid.
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Figure 3.5: The chalk-cup for the real object auction
First price auction instructions
If your bid is less than the highest bid, you lose the auction. As a loser, you get
the endowment of 700 points:
Payoff = 700.
All pay auction instructions
If your bid is less than the highest bid, you lose the auction. As a loser, you get
the endowment of 700 points minus your bid:
Payoff = 700 - bid.
Any questions?
Please enter your cabin number and your bid.
Cabin number:
Bid:
INSTRUCTIONS Induced value auction
You now take part in an auction. For this you get an endowment of 700 points.
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Task
At the beginning of the auction you will be divided into groups of three. You will
not learn who the other participants in your group are. Your task in the three-group
is that of a bidder who bids for a fictious item in an auction. For this you can spend
an arbitrary amount of your endowment of 700 points. Your bid must have a maxi-
mum of two decimal places.
Your value
Before the auction starts, you will see on your computer screen a list of 10 num-
bers. Each of these numbers is between 0 and 300 points. The numbers are chosen
randomly by the computer, where each number can occur with equal probability.
Each number represents a possible value for you for the fictious item in the auction.
The process of generating the values is identical for all participants. This means that
every participant in your group of three got a different list of 10 numbers, where each
number is chosen randomly and independently from your numbers from the interval
of [0,300].
We ask you to enter a bid for each of your 10 possible values in the column next
to the values. For this you can spend an arbitrary amount of your endowment of 700
points.
Thus, you enter bids for ten auctions. However, only one of the ten auctions
performed will be payoff relevant. The computer will randomly select one of the ten
auctions, where each auction is equally likely. This means that you should enter for
each of the ten possible auctions your bid such as if it were the only auction that is
conducted. So, for each auction you have an endowment of 700 points and its value
on which you can bid is a number between 0 and 300 points.
Rules
The auction rules for each three-person group are that the participant with the
highest bid wins the auction in their group and thus the cup. If several bidders have
the same highest bid, we will then toss a coin to determine the winner.
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Figure 3.6: Example of a screen with an auction list
As the winner you will receive the cup, plus the endowment of 700 points minus
your bid:
Payoff = cup + 700 - your bid.
First price auction instructions
If your bid is less than the highest bid, you lose the auction. As a loser, you get
the endowment of 700 points:
Payoff = 700.
All pay auction instructions
If your bid is less than the highest bid, you lose the auction. As a loser, you get
the endowment of 700 points minus your bid:
Payoff = 700 - bid.
Do you have any questions on this?
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After you have entered all 10 bids on the screen, please press the OK button. You
are then asked again to confirm your choices and you can once again decide whether
you want to make changes.
The auction begins now with several control questions to ensure that all partici-
pants understand the rules.
Any questions?
Control questions on screen
Question 1: What is the smallest value you can get?
Question2: What is the highest value you can get?
Example of an auction: Player 1 has a value of 1 and bids 1, player 2 has a value
of 20 and bids 2 and player 3 has a value of 30 and bids 3.
Question 3: Who wins the auction?
Question 4: What is the payoff for player 1?
Question 5: What is the payoff for player 2?
Question 6: What is the payoff for player 3?
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